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English summary
Adults, children and hummingbirds. An investigation into the develop­
ment of scalar implicatures and the variables that influence them
Katrijn Pipijn
Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Walter Schaeken; Co-supervisor : Dr. Sara Verbrugge
In the present dissertation we will make an in-depth investigation of scalar implicatures 
with an emphasis on developmental studies. There are a few different aspects we will fo-
cus on. In the first two studies, we will first of all look at the effects of task difficulty. In the 
literature the effects of load on pragmatic reasoning has been shown, but other studies 
have shown that there is no effect of task difficulty. We believe that the lack of this effect 
was due to the task paradigms that were used. Using altered versions of these paradigms 
we hope to show that there are in fact effects of task difficulty and that these are similar 
to load effects. Secondly, we will look at the effect of response measure on pragmatic 
reasoning. More specifically, we will look at the effect of responding on a scale, compared 
to giving binary responses. These effects have been studied in the literature before and 
we intend to replicate them using the earlier mentioned altered task paradigms. In a 
third study, we will look at reversed scalars, a specific item type that has, to our knowl-
edge, not been investigated in detail in previous implicature work. The reversed scalars 
are an item type that has been considered a control item in previous research but we 
believe it is not. We will investigate how these items are processed at different ages and 
we will propose a theory to explain them: the violation tolerance hypothesis. In the final 
chapter, we will look at scalar diversity, or how reasoning is dependent on the specific 
scalar implicatures that are used. 
In the first two studies, we found effects of task difficulty with children. These effects 
were not present in adults or preschoolers though. We believe that for adults, all the 
different tasks that we used were still too easy. With none of the tasks being difficult 
enough, we were not able to burden their cognitive resources enough for them to ex-
perience difficulty in producing scalar implicatures. For preschoolers we had to adjust 
the more difficult task to make it more child-friendly, but by doing this we probably 
minimized the difference in difficulty between the used tasks. We found effects of re-
sponse measure, for all age groups. This clearly shows that using a scalar response option 
gives us much more information than the conventional two-alternative forced choice 
measure does. Like we expected, children interpreted reversed scalars differently than 
what is predicted by the literature and even adults showed a tendency to interpret 
them incorrectly too. For our third study, we used an experiment to test our violation 
tolerance hypothesis but the results of this study did not confirm it. We believe however 
that this was due to the fact that we tested adults and that testing children will give more 
conclusive evidence in one direction or the other. For the final chapter we found a large 
diversity in the processing of different Horn scales. Many studies on scalar implicatures 
have focused on the flagship example of <some, all>. This study joins a growing amount 
of research that addresses the issue that there is in fact large scalar diversity and not all 
the different scales can just be put together.

Nederlandstalige samenvatting
Volwassenen, kinderen en kolibries. Een onderzoek naar de ontwikke­
ling van scalaire implicaturen en de variabelen die ze beïnvloeden
Katrijn Pipijn
Promotor: Prof. Dr. Walter Schaeken; Copromotor: Dr. Sara Verbrugge
In deze verhandeling voeren we een diepgaand onderzoek uit naar scalaire implicaturen 
met een nadruk op ontwikkelingsonderzoek. Er zijn een paar verschillende aspecten 
waar we ons op hebben gefocust. In de eerste twee onderzoeken keken we naar de 
effecten van de moeilijkheid van de taak. In de literatuur werd herhaaldelijk een effect 
van cognitieve belasting op ons pragmatisch redeneren aangetoond, maar andere studies 
konden geen effect van taakmoeilijkheid vinden. We geloven dat het gebrek aan dit effect 
in deze studies te wijten is aan de taakparadigma’s die werden gebruikt. Door de ge-
bruikte taakparadigma’s aan te passen hoopten we toch het effect van taakmoeilijkheid 
te kunnen aantonen en evidentie te vinden dat deze effecten vergelijkbaar zijn aan het 
effect van cognitieve belasting. Ten tweede keken we naar het effect van de responsmaat 
op ons pragmatisch redeneren. Meer specifiek keken we naar het effect van antwoor-
den op een schaal in plaats van binaire antwoordmogelijkheden. Dit effect is reeds in de 
literatuur onderzocht en we wilden dit effect verder bevestigen met de vooraf vermelde 
en aangepaste taakparadigma’s. Ten derde keken we naar reversed scalars, een specifieke 
term voor een itemtype dat, zover wij weten, niet eerder onderzocht werd. Dit item 
werd in het verleden als een controle-item beschouwd maar wij geloven dat het toch 
unieker is. We onderzochten hoe dit specifieke item verwerkt wordt op verschillende 
leeftijden en we stelden een theorie voor om dit item uit te leggen: de Overtreding 
Tolerantie Hypothese. In het laatste hoofdstuk keken we naar scalaire diversiteit, of hoe 
ons redeneren afhangt van de specifieke scalaire implicatuur die gebruikt wordt.
In de eerste twee studies vonden we een effect van taakmoeilijkheid bij kinderen. Deze 
effecten waren niet aanwezig bij volwassenen en kleuters. We geloven dat de taken die 
we gebruikt hebben in onze studies te gemakkelijk waren voor volwassenen. Omwille 
van deze reden werden de cognitieve vermogens van de volwassenen nooit genoeg 
belast tot het punt waarop hun pragmatisch redeneren eronder zou lijden. Bij de kleu-
ters hebben we de moeilijkere taak moeten aanpassen omdat hij anders té moeilijk was, 
hierdoor hebben we waarschijnlijk het verschil in moeilijkheid met de gemakkelijkere 
taak geminimaliseerd. 
We vonden effecten van de gebruikte responsmaat voor alle leeftijdsgroepen. Dit toont 
duidelijk aan dat een scalaire responsmogelijkheid veel meer informatie geeft dan een 
binaire responsmogelijkheid. Zoals we verwachtten, interpreteerden kinderen reversed 
scalars op een andere manier dan de literatuur zou voorspellen. Zelfs volwassenen toon-
den een kleine neiging om de items ook incorrect te interpreteren. In onze derde studie 
hebben we een taak gebruikt die tot doel had onze Overtreding Tolerantie  Hypothese 
te bevestigen, maar onze resultaten spraken deze hypothese tegen. We geloven echter 
dat dit ligt aan het feit dat we volwassenen hebben getest en dat kinderen meer geschikt 
waren geweest om onze hypothese te testen. In het laatste hoofdstuk vonden we een 
grote diversiteit tussen verschillende Horn schalen. Vele studies in het verleden zijn geba-
seerd op de schaal <sommige, alle>. Onze studie sluit zich aan bij een groeiende groep 
literatuur die aantoont dat er eigenlijk een grote diversiteit bestaat tussen schalen en dat 
men niet zomaar conclusies kan formuleren op basis van dit ene voorbeeld.
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General introduction
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2
In August 2013, Google introduced Google Hummingbird. Google Hum-
mingbird was the new algorithm that supports Google search. Previously, 
if you would look up something on Google, the old algorithm would 
look at the exact words that you were searching for, or at synonyms of 
these words. The new Hummingbird algorithm goes much further than 
that. On top of the exact words, it looks at the context and the meaning 
of these words. Hummingbird looks at the intent of the person carrying 
out the search, it will look at the whole sentences and interpret them. 
The main focus is ‘why is this person typing in this search, what does he 
or she want to know?’. These types of questions can be categorized in 
sub disciplines of linguistics and are called semantics and pragmatics. On 
the one hand we have semantics, the study of the meaning of words. 
On the other hand there is pragmatics, which studies the way in which 
context contributes to the meaning of these words and the sentences 
they are used in. Pragmatics is what we will focus on in this dissertation. 
Google Hummingbird is only one of the many applications of pragmatics. 
In our everyday communication pragmatics is used constantly too. When 
we speak we say a lot of things explicitly, but there might be even more 
things that we say implicitly. Consider the following dialogue: 
(1) -  A: Can we go see a movie tonight?
-  B: I have to work late.
The response given by person B does not seem to be a direct re-
sponse to the question asked by A. Yet we can derive it anyway. By saying 
that he has to work late, person B is saying that he will not be able to go 
see a movie that night. On top of that, he also gives the reason why. The 
reason why is said explicitly and the actual response to the question was 
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implicit. This phenomenon cannot be explained by semantics. The person 
asking the question will derive his answer by using pragmatics. He will 
use all the information he has about the world and the other person to 
interpret his response and come to the right conclusion. 
This is one of the spectacular potentials of the human mind. Just 
like Google Hummingbird, we are able to process massive amounts of 
context information in fractions of seconds and interpret sentences in 
the correct way. However, occasionally, the fascinating machinery that is 
our brain, fails. On the one hand, we sometimes do not interpret all the 
available information in the correct way, leading to an incorrect inter-
pretation. On the other hand, this particular feature of our mind is not 
fully developed yet in children. For example imagine the earlier conver-
sation occurring between a mother and child. It is easy to imagine that 
the child does not recognize his mother’s response as an answer to his 
question, that he does not see the relevance of the response. Research 
has shown that pragmatics is particularly hard for people with Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (Baltaxe, 1977; De Villiers, Stainton, & Szatmari, 2007; 
Surian, 1996). These difficulties are present in both children and adults 
with Autism Disorder and Asperger syndrome. Asperger Syndrome is an 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) that is characterized by high-function-
ing children and adults that do not have significant delays or difficulties in 
language or cognitive development as opposed to other forms of ASD 
like High-functioning Autism. Although both groups have difficulty with 
pragmatics, adults with Asperger syndrome do seem better at deriving 
scalar implicatures than a matched group with High-functioning Autism 
(Pijnacker, Hagoort, Buitelaar, Teunisse, & Geurts 2009). It seems that 
those specific language skills that adults with Asperger Syndrome have 
but adults with High-functioning Autism do not have, are indispensible to 
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make pragmatic inferences. To understand why these irregularities occur, 
and thus how children or adults with Autism Spectrum Disorder think, 
but also to advance technological applications and artificial intelligence, 
it is important to investigate the way our mind handles pragmatics. Es-
pecially a focus on developmental research is essential to help children 
and people with ASD in the future. By understanding pragmatics we can 
influence, intervene and remediate people and especially children when 
necessary. Moreover, if we move towards a future in which communica-
ting with computers and robots is an indispensible part of our daily lives, 
being able to explain this discipline is essential, and Google Hummingbird 
is one step closer towards this goal. 
Off course Google Hummingbird does not only rely on one 
subfield of linguistics in its algorithm. There are many subfields within 
linguistics, for example phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics and 
pragmatics. Most of these will be of some importance in the algorithm. 
Each subfield focuses on one specific aspect of how we use words and 
language. In this dissertation however, we will only focus on one aspect: 
pragmatics. Pragmatics studies the relationship between what is said and 
the context in which it is said. It comes from the assumption that when 
we utter a sentence, more often than not, there is a lot more information 
to be derived if one knows the context in which the sentence is uttered. 
For instance it might be significant who exactly utters the sentence. For 
example when you are driving in a car and your passenger says they 
need a restroom, you know you probably will have time enough to drive 
to the next gas station. However, when your passenger is not an adult 
but a two-year-old that is in the midst of toilet training, it might be wiser 
to stop right away instead of driving another 10 miles. The rest of the 
conversation in which a sentence is said can be important as well to un-
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derstand the correct meaning of an utterance. For example ‘The sun is 
coming out’ will have a different meaning when it is preceded by ‘I really 
should get out of bed and start my day’ than when it is preceded by ‘win-
ter is finally over’. In the former it means that the sun is appearing above 
the horizon while in the latter the sun could be interpreted more sym-
bolic as ‘a warmer season’. But not only context is important, common 
knowledge of linguistics is important too. When someone says ‘John and 
Julie got married and went on vacation’, most people will suppose it hap-
pened in that order, partly because most people plan a honeymoon after 
their wedding, but also because of the way the sentence was construct-
ed. If the sentence was constructed another way ‘John and Julie went on 
vacation and got married’, it suddenly becomes a lot less clear in which 
order they had those activities planned. Yet in most social situations, the 
intentions of the speaker are clear to the listener and the ability to un-
derstand these intentions is called pragmatic competence. Within prag-
matics, there are several areas of interest that have been researched over 
the years. In this dissertation we will focus on implicatures. Implicatures 
are pieces of information that can be derived from an utterance, but are 
not explicitly expressed or strictly implied. An example of an implicature 
is the previously mentioned sentence about John and Julie. Most people 
will assume that they got married before their honeymoon, so they will 
make the implicature. However, an important aspect of implicatures is 
that they are cancellable. If someone adds ‘not necessarily in that order’, 
than the implicature is cancelled but the meaning of the original sentence 
is not altered. 
A lot of research has been done on implicatures but experimen-
tal research on the subject has really lifted off after a study by Noveck 
(2001). Before this time, most of the work done was theoretical work 
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that relied mainly on pragmatic intuitions and only in rare cases were 
they accompanied by observational data. The theoretical framework 
around implicatures is much older than the study by Noveck and started 
off with the work done by Grice (Grice, 1975; Grice, 1991). Grice states 
that people follow a cooperative principle in a conversation, which fur-
thers the purpose of that conversation. The cooperative principle states 
that people follow certain rules when they participate in a conversation. 
These rules will adapt to the specific needs of that conversation. Grice 
describes these rules in what he calls Maxims. These Maxims are: Maxim 
of Quality, Maxim of Quantity, Maxim of Relation and Maxim of Man-
ner (see Table 1). The Maxim of Quality states that you should only say 
things that you believe are true and that you should not say anything for 
which you lack any adequate evidence. The Maxim of Quantity states 
that you should limit your contribution to a conversation and only give 
that information that is required and nothing more. The Maxim of Re-
lation expects you to only give information that is relevant to the con-
versation. Lastly, the Maxim of Manner imposes you to avoid obscurity 
of expression, avoid ambiguity, be brief and be orderly. The cooperative 
principle works in the two directions of the conversations. The speaker 
ought to stick to these principles in what he says, and the listener in his 
turn will assume that the speaker is sticking to them to interpret what is 
said. The interpretation of implicatures can then be explained by these 
Maxims. We will use our earlier example (1) about going to the movies 
to illustrate this. When we look at the response given by B by itself, it 
does not seem to be a response to the question asked by A. However, 
if A assumes that person B is conversing according to the cooperative 
principle, he will assume that the information that person B is giving, is 
relevant (Maxim of Relation) and that it is true (Maxim of Quality). He 
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can also assume that person B was trying to be brief (Maxim of Manner) 
and that he therefore left out a step of his train of thought. Person A will 
combine all this information, together with his general knowledge that it 
is not possible to go to the movies and work late at the same time. As a 
results, person A can only come to the conclusion that person B will not 
be able to go to the movies with him. 
Table 1. Grice’s Maxims of communication
Grice distinguishes between two types of implicatures: conven-
tional and conversational. A conventional implicature does not rely on 
these maxims of conversation, because the implicature is not context 
dependent. Instead it is related to the form of the expression and to the 
conventional meaning of the words used in the sentences. Consider the 
following example: She is small but strong. Using the word ‘but’ in this 
sentence indicates that there is a contradiction in the sentence, more 
precisely between the words ‘small’ and ‘strong’. The speaker indicates 
that he believes these two characteristics don’t usually co-occur, but it 
is not explicitly said. He uses a conventional implicatures to express this 
Linguistic Principle Criterion Violations
Quality Truth Exaggeration, fantastical, 
  excessive description 
Quantity Informativeness Redundancy, repetition, 
  excessive brevity
Relation Relevance Digression
Manner Clarity Vagueness, obliqueness, 
  metaphor
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opinion. Conversational implicatures on the other hand are dependent 
on the context. To interpret them correctly, one must take into account 
the meaning of the words and think according to the Maxims of com-
munication. The examples of these conversational implicatures are de-
scribed in the previous paragraphs.
In this dissertation we will focus on scalar implicatures. These are 
a specific type of conversational implicatures that contain a scalar term. 
The implicature lies in the assumption that when someone uses a less 
informative scalar term (for example the word some) in a conversation 
or a sentence, the use of this word implicates the negation of a stronger 
word with a similar meaning (for example the word all). This assump-
tion can be made on the basis of the maxims described above. If the 
stronger word were actually more suitable, then a speaker would have 
used it. However, the speaker did not use it; therefore, it is probably not 
adequate for the situation. When a person makes the implicature and 
adopts the interpretation of the scalar term that was described just now, 
the person is reasoning pragmatically. However, a person could also in-
terpret the scalar term more broadly, in a way that includes the stronger 
term instead of rejecting it. This would be a logical interpretation of the 
scalar term. 
An important aspect of scalar implicatures is that they are can-
cellable (Grice, 1991). Because there is an ambiguity between the two 
interpretations it is possible that when the listener interprets the scalar 
term pragmatically, he makes some assumptions that are not correct. It is 
however possible that more context information becomes available later 
on, that contradicts the assumptions made by the listener. In this case, 
the meaning of the scalar term can easily be changed to the broader 
interpretation that entails the stronger term, or the speaker can change 
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his or hers initial utterance all together to an utterance with the strong 
scalar term. The scalar implicature will therefore be cancelled. This cancel-
lability aspect is considered to be a good criterion as to whether or not 
a scalar implicature is a conversational implicature (Grice, 1991). There 
is a consensus in the literature that the cancellation of a scalar term in 
an utterance is not sufficient to speak of a conversational implicature. 
Whether or not the cancellability is a necessary criterion to speak of a 
conversational implicature however is not so clear. While Grice believes 
it is, both Weiner (2006) and van Kuppevelt (1996) do not believe it is 
necessary. Weiner has shown various cases in which cancelling an impli-
catures does not lead the listener to adjust his belief in the pragmatic 
interpretation. One of the main cases he discusses are instances of sar-
casm in which the cancellation even strengthens the belief in the prag-
matic interpretation. Borge (2009) argues that in this case the utterance 
is reinforced instead of cancelled. Therefore Borge believes that sarcastic 
utterances are special cases and that cancellation is still a necessary crite-
rion. Van Kuppevelt (1996) presents instances in which it is not possible 
to cancel the implicature all together, for example when the implicature 
consists of a numeral that is the focus of the utterance. Other authors 
however believe that the examples presented by van Kuppevelt are not 
even implicatures in the first place (e.g., Spector, 2013). In summary, we 
can conclude that because of their uncertain nature scalar implicatures 
are cancellable. Whether or not this cancellation is successful or not, de-
pends on the specific nature of the scalar implication in question.
Within the current literature, there are two conflicting theories on 
how scalar implicatures actually work, the Default account and the Con-
text-driven account. The Default account (Chierchia, 2004; Grice, 1991; 
Grodner, Klein, Carbary, & Tanenhaus, 2010; Horn, 1984; Levinson, 2000) 
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assumes that the pragmatic interpretation of scalar terms is the default 
interpretation. The rejection of the stronger term happens automatically. 
The scalar term will only be interpreted logically when the context indi-
cates that the implicature has to be undone. Therefore, the logical inter-
pretation will be more effortful than the pragmatic default interpretation. 
The Context-driven account (Carston, 1997; Sperber, Wilson, He, & Ran, 
1986) does not believe that the implicature is made by default. According 
to this theory, it is more cost effectively to start with the logical interpre-
tation that still entails the stronger term. Only when necessary, when the 
context demands it, a more elaborate interpretation will be constructed. 
This pragmatic interpretation will not be automatic and will therefore 
require more energy. From these two conflicting theories, the Default 
account seems more intuitive to a lot of people. It seems very natural 
to interpret the word some in a way that excludes all. However, many 
experimental findings seem to point in the direction of the Context-driv-
en account. First of all, many studies have shown that children do not 
have the same pragmatic fluency in interpreting implicatures as adults do 
(Braine & Rumain, 1981; Feeney, Scrafton, Duckworth, & Handley, 2004; 
Guasti et al., 2005; Noveck, 2001; Noveck & Sperber, 2007; Papafragou 
& Musolino, 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004; Paris, 1973; Pouscou-
lous, Noveck, Politzer, & Bastide, 2007; Smith, 1980; Sternberg, 1979). 
This seems to support the idea that the logical interpretation develops 
first in children and that the pragmatic interpretation only develops later 
on in childhood. This is in accordance with the Context-driven account. 
Secondly, Bott and Noveck (2004) have showed that people produce 
logical interpretations of scalar implicatures faster than pragmatic inter-
pretations. This is also in accordance with the Context-driven account. 
Faster reaction times in producing logical interpretations point in the 
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direction that logical interpretations are more automatic and default than 
pragmatic interpretations. Thirdly, it has also been shown that when par-
ticipants’ cognitive resources are burdened with a secondary task, they 
appear to become more logical, compared to when they have all their 
cognitive resources at their disposal (De Neys & Schaeken, 2007). This is 
perfectly explainable by the Context-driven account. When people have 
all of their cognitive resources at their disposal, they are able to make 
the implicature and reason pragmatically. When these resources are bur-
dened however, only the automatic logical responses, which require the 
least effort, remain and they will not be overruled by the pragmatic ones. 
Breheny, Katsos, and Williams (2006) conducted a study in which they 
measured reading times of utterances containing a scalar term. In some 
utterances it was important to make the scalar implicature to interpret 
the utterance correctly while in others it was not. They found that reading 
times of the scalar term were longer when the pragmatic interpretation 
was optimal. This confirms that making the implicature takes up more 
time and is not an automated process. A final study conducted by Tom-
linson Jr, Bailey, and Bott (2013) used a novel mouse-tracking paradigm 
that revealed that participants start off with a basic logical interpretation 
of a scalar term and later on enrich that interpretation towards the scalar 
implicature. In the experiment, participants had to judge utterances with 
scalar terms and they had to use their mouse to click either left or right 
in a, respectively, true or false box. Results showed that the movement 
towards the ‘false’ box for the scalar implicature items started off in the 
direction of the ‘true’ box and only halfway changed direction towards 
the ‘false’ box. It seems the thinking process started off with a logical in-
terpretation and was changed to a pragmatic interpretation later on. This 
small detour of the mouse track was not observed for the control items. 
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All these findings point towards a theory that states that the pro-
cessing costs for a pragmatic interpretation are higher than those for a 
logical one. However, this theorem has been opposed by Grodner et 
al. (2010) and Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino (2013). The results of these 
studies undermine the conclusion that scalar implicatures are time con-
suming. Politzer-Ahles and Fiorentino (2013) found in their experiment 
that reading times for utterances were not longer when the appropriate 
interpretation of the scalar term was the pragmatic one. In their exper-
iment in which they tracked eye-movement, Grodner et al. (2010) pre-
sented participants with two separate pictures and a sentence containing 
a scalar term. The two pictures both depicted the same scenario, with 
only a small difference. One of the pictures showed the situation how 
it would be if the scalar term were interpreted in the logical way, while 
the other picture showed the scenario with the pragmatic interpretation 
of the scalar term. The eye-movement data revealed that participants 
focused their attention on the picture with the pragmatic interpretation 
of the scalar term, as soon as the scalar term was mentioned, with-
out any delay. These results were challenged by Huang and Snedeker 
(2009). They could not replicate the findings by Grodner et al.; instead 
they found that participants waited until they heard the whole utter-
ance before focusing their attention to one picture or the other. The 
reason for this discrepancy probably lies in the used stimuli, as pointed 
out by Degen and Tanenhaus (2011). While the study by Grodner et al. 
only used the scalar terms all, some and none, Huang and Snedeker also 
used numerical expressions like exactly two. Because of these additional 
terms, the uncertainty of what the meaning of the sentence would be 
increased. It indicated that the participants needed the whole utterance 
to interpret the scalar term and again that the pragmatic interpretation 
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was not an automatic one. A final study that confirmed this hypothesis 
was conducted by Bott, Bailey, and Grodner (2012). They studied how 
regular scalar implicatures differed from sentences that contained the 
term only some. They found that correctly rejecting sentences with this 
expression took less time than interpreting a regular scalar implicature. 
All these results clearly point into the direction that producing scalar 
implicatures is a time consuming and costly process and confirm the 
Context-driven account.  
1.1. Overview of the experimental studies
In the present dissertation we will make a more in-depth investigation 
of scalar implicatures with a focus on developmental studies. There are a 
few different aspects we will focus on. First of all, we will look at the ef-
fects of task difficulty. We will work with several different task paradigms. 
Secondly, we will look at the effect of response measure on pragmatic 
reasoning. More specifically, we will look at the effect of responding on 
a scale, compared to giving binary responses. Thirdly, we will look at re-
versed scalars, a specific item type that has, to our knowledge, not been 
investigated in detail in previous implicature work. Reversed scalars are 
utterances that are logically incorrect. They consist of a statement con-
taining all, when the correct term would actually be some but not all. 
An example of this statement is found in Noveck (2001), ‘All dogs have 
spots’. Noveck calls these statements false all statements. These items 
only contain a violation of the logical truth and no pragmatic violation. 
Therefore, we would expect participants to treat these items as com-
pletely false. However, we will find in our studies that these particular 
items are not just one of the many control items. These three aspects 
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will be investigated in Chapters 2 through 4. In Chapter 5, we will look 
at scalar diversity, or how reasoning is dependent on the specific scalar 
implicatures that are used. 
1.2. Chapter 2
Research has shown that children appear to be more logical than adults. 
Research has also shown however, that children are very susceptible to 
pragmatic reasoning when certain task features are changed. In the first 
chapter, we made a comparison between children and adults in two 
separate experiments. In both experiments we worked with a set of 
different tasks. Previous research has already shown that when cognitive 
resources are burdened, mostly by a secondary task, people become less 
pragmatic. Because we were investigating children, we decided to not 
make our experiments any more complicated than necessary by adding 
a secondary task. Instead we opted to work with different tasks that var-
ied in difficulty. We also worked with different response measures. Pre-
vious research has shown that both children’s and adults’ performances 
are influenced when they have to give their responses on a scale instead 
of giving binary responses like in most implicature research. It seems that 
the option of a scale gives a more fine-grained reflection of the thinking 
process behind scalar implicatures. The main difference between Exper-
iment 1 and Experiment 2 will be that in Experiment 1 we only worked 
with the scalar response measure, while in Experiment 2, we worked 
with a within-subjects design and all participants received both the bina-
ry response measure and the scalar response measure. Our results were 
as we expected. First of all, task difficulty made a significant difference 
on pragmatic reasoning. Especially for children, this effect was large, for 
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adults it was either small or even not present. It seems that a more diffi-
cult task will cause children to be even more logical than adults. Secondly, 
we found that scalar responses do indeed give a more detailed look 
into the reasoning process behind implicatures. Like previous research, 
we found that scalar responses were capable of eliminating the differ-
ences between adults and children on scalar implicatures, a difference 
that remained for the binary response condition. Finally, we also found 
that reversed scalars, an item type that has not received any attention in 
previous research, elicit responses that cannot be explained by conven-
tional theories. We found that children treat these particular items very 
similar to scalar implicatures. Adults however, seem to treat these items 
like control items when responding binary, but more like scalar implica-
tures when responding on a scale. This particular finding is important as 
it sheds lights on how scalar implicatures are formed and on the theories 
that explain them. Theories predict that scalar implicatures are formed 
because of a combination of the cooperative principle and the ambiguity 
between the logical and pragmatic interpretation of the weaker scalar 
term. If this is the case than there is no reason for the reversed scalar, 
which only contains the stronger scalar term, to be interpreted in any 
other way than control items. 
1.3. Chapter 3
The goal of the study in Chapter 3 was to further explore reversed 
scalars. Because we found that the children that were tested in Chapter 
2 were still fairly pragmatic, a result that is systematically found in scalar 
implicatures studies with Dutch-speaking participants, (Banga, Heutinck, 
Berends, & Hendriks, 2009; De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Dieussaert, Verk-
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erk, Gillard, & Schaeken, 2011; Janssens, Fabry and Schaeken, 2014), we 
decided to test preschoolers in this experiment. We were interested in 
how preschoolers would process reversed scalars. In addition, we want-
ed to compare our results to other literature in which preschoolers 
were also tested. We again used different tasks, for the same reasons as 
explained in the previous chapter, and a within-subjects design with two 
response measures. We did not find an effect of task difficulty. We did not 
find a main effect of response measure, but we did find an interaction 
between response measure and item type. It seems that preschoolers 
are aware of the two-folded interpretation of some. This experiment 
confirmed that children process reversed scalars differently than control 
items. 
1.4. Chapter 4
In Chapter 4 we make a first attempt to explain reversed scalars. Con-
trary to the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis that has been described in 
the literature we propose a violation tolerance hypothesis. This hypoth-
esis is broader than the scope of the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis. 
Not only does the violation tolerance explain scalar implicatures, it also 
explains reversed scalars. To test this hypothesis, we used a task, which 
was more abstract than the tasks used in the previous chapters. We pre-
dicted that our results could follow two different patterns, which would 
indicate whether participants reasoned either semantically or pragmati-
cally. These response patterns would also indicate if the pragmatic toler-
ance hypothesis or the violation tolerance hypothesis would be a bet-
ter explanation of how people reason. Our results did not support the 
violation tolerance hypothesis but did not outright reject it either. We 
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suspect that testing our paradigm on children should bring more clarity 
on the matter. 
1.5. Chapter 5
In the final chapter we investigated scalar diversity. While most studies on 
scalar implicatures use the flagship example of all and some, we decided 
to look at other scales and how they are interpreted. Previous literature 
has already shown that not all scalar implicatures are processed in the 
same way. In a first experiment, we tested adults on several different 
scales. We included a secondary task to burden their cognitive resources 
to make the participants less pragmatic. We used a between-subjects 
design with the two response measures. We found an effect of response 
measure but no effect of load. We did find, like we expected, large dif-
ferences between the different scales. Notwithstanding our load condi-
tions, participants were still extremely pragmatic on some item types. We 
therefore conducted a second experiment with preschoolers, whom we 
expected to be less pragmatic than adults. To simplify the task for pre-
schoolers, we used a smaller set of scales and no load condition. Again, 
we included a between-subject response measure condition. For the 
preschoolers, we did not find an effect of response measure, but we did 
find a clear effect of the different scales. It seems clear that the flagship 
example of ‘some’ might not be as representative for scalar implicatures 
as we all like to pretend. 
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Abstract
The pragmatic tolerance hypothesis (Katsos & Smith, 2010) was origi-
nated to explain the difference between children and adults concerning 
scalar implicatures. The use of a Likert-scale was introduced to test this 
hypothesis. We conducted two studies in which we compare adults’ and 
children’s binary and scalar responses to the same underinformative sen-
tences. We also used three separate tasks to look at the effects of task 
difficulty on performance. The results show that for children, the more 
difficult tasks lead to fewer pragmatic responses compared to the easier 
task, Drawings; for adults this difference is not present. Confirming the 
study by Katsos and Smith (2010; see also Katsos & Bishop, 2011) both 
children and adults choose the middle options on the scale more when 
they are confronted with scalar implicatures and they choose more ex-
treme options for the control sentences. Reversed scalar items however 
are not interpreted as we expected and this advocates for a more gen-
eral violation tolerance hypotheses.
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2.1. Introduction
Communication is not always as straightforward as one might think. In 
1989 Grice published his work on the cooperative principle that was 
meant to explain how our human interaction could be described. The 
cooperative principle expects a person to interact in a way that furthers 
the purpose of a conversation and indicates that a listener expects a 
speaker to do so. The cooperative principle is the reason why people 
would use scalar implicatures. A listener can interpret something a speak-
er says with an implicature. When this happens, the meaning of what that 
speaker says is not explicitly communicated, but the listener derives it 
nonetheless from what is said. The utterance is underinformative; more 
information could have been given but has not. For example when a wife 
asks her husband whether he’ll be home for supper, and the husband an-
swers that he has a meeting that will run late that day, then the husband 
is using an implicature. His wife will not expect him for dinner. One can 
assume that she accepts the meeting running late will be the reason, or 
at least a possible reason, that the husband will not be present at dinner. 
Nevertheless it is still possible that the husband will appear for dinner, for 
the implicature is cancellable. It is possible that the husband just meant he 
would be a little late for dinner; still he would not have lied in his earlier 
utterance. 
One specific form of implicatures is scalar implicatures, which we 
will focus on in this paper. As the name implies, scalar implicatures con-
sist of words that can be situated on a scale, known as Horn scales (see 
Horn, 1984). These words range from less informative to more informa-
tive, for example a scale containing words like none, some and all. For this 
particular scale, each word further on the scale contains more elements 
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of a group. When a speaker uses a specific less informative scalar word 
in an utterance, it is implicated that the more informative word is not 
applicable. When a person uses the word some, the word all would not 
be appropriate. It is considered a mutual understanding between speaker 
and recipient that the speaker would have used the more informative 
word if it were suitable. Nevertheless he deliberately chose to use the 
less informative word on the scale therefore the more informative is 
not suitable. For example when the prime minister says ‘Some banks 
are collapsing due to the financial crisis’, a citizen can assume that not all 
banks are collapsing due to this crisis, for the expression of some impli-
cates not all. The citizen presumes that the prime minister would have 
said ‘All banks are collapsing due to the financial crisis’ if this were the 
case. If a few months later the prime minister makes the announcement 
‘All the banks have collapsed due to the financial crisis’, this would not 
be a withdrawal of his earlier statement. It is a specific characteristic of 
implicatures is that they are cancellable in only one direction. When a 
speaker uses the weaker term some, it can later easily be corrected to all. 
Yet when a speaker initially uses the stronger term all, it is not possible 
to change it to some later on. At least not without admitting one was er-
roneous the first time. The weaker term some entails the stronger term 
all but not vice versa. 
When a speaker uses the word some in an utterance, there are two 
different ways to interpret this weak scalar term. The first way is the prag-
matic way that was described above. A recipient might produce a scalar 
implicature and assume that the speaker meant some and not all with 
the statement. Yet another way of interpreting the word some is a purely 
explicit logical interpretation. The explicit meaning of the word some is 
at least one and possibly all. Both interpretation of the word are equally 
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correct and it is the choice of the recipient on how he will interpret it. 
We already know from different studies that children and adults 
interpret scalar implicatures in alternative ways. Noveck (2001) argues 
that a weak scalar term is understood in its explicit meaning first and will 
appear first in human development. Only later on the more complex 
pragmatic meaning will be incorporated. This argument is clearly demon-
strated by the results of Noveck’s study (2001). He found how children 
of 7-8 years old and 10-11 years old have acceptance rates of 89% and 
85% for sentences that are logically true but pragmatically infelicitous. 
Adults on the other hand, accept these sentences in only 41% of the 
cases. This clearly demonstrated how for children the pragmatic meaning 
of these sentences is not incorporated. While for adults these pragmatic 
meanings are fully incorporated and are used as the principal criterion to 
accept or reject sentences. The results also show how these differences 
between children and adults cannot be explained by the children’s limit-
ed understanding of words like ‘some’ and ‘all’. For all the different utter-
ances that do not hold a conflict between the logical and the pragmatic 
meaning, the answering patterns of children and adults are very alike. 
The reason for the discrepancy between children and adults is 
not entirely clear. Various factors seem to contribute to this develop-
mental trend. Noveck explains it by the posterior development of the 
pragmatic understanding of underinformative sentences. The processing 
of the pragmatic meaning of underinformative sentences is cognitively 
much more demanding than the processing of the logical meaning (De 
Neys & Schaeken, 2007). Children, however, have less available cognitive 
resources (Gathercole, Pickering, & Ambridge, 2004). Because of this, the 
pragmatic interpretation is harder to incorporate for children. Another 
factor that contributes to this is the nature of the task. 
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Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer, & Bastide (2007) reported exper-
iments in which they changed the nature of the task from verbal judg-
ments to action-based judgments. Using small boxes that contained to-
kens, participants were asked to alter the setting of the tokens to match 
a statement. They were also allowed to leave a setting as it was. Within 
the experimental design, children’s capability to produce implicatures was 
much higher than in experiments with verbal judgments. This increased 
implicature production was found for all ages (4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds as 
well as adults). Still, the developmental effect was present. These experi-
ments show how the understanding of implicatures can be facilitated in 
young children by changing task features. Other studies have also shown 
how changing task features can facilitate children’s performance (Guasti 
et al., 2005; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004).
Katsos and Smith (2010) did research on underinformative sen-
tences in children and adults. They proposed the pragmatic tolerance hy-
pothesis to explain for the differences between children and adults as well 
as differences between adults. The starting point of this hypothesis is that 
there are different degrees of violations. Several violations can lie within 
an utterance yet not every violation is equally grave. Participants can and 
will reject utterances that are a grave violation of the logical truth. Yet they 
might accept or reject an utterance that only holds a violation of informa-
tiveness and thus is an infringement of the cooperative principle. There is 
no implicit rule on how to deal with pragmatically infelicitous utterances. 
The threshold of what is and what is not acceptable is individual for each 
person and is called pragmatic tolerance by Katsos and Smith (2010).  
An obvious way to test this hypothesis was adopted by Katsos and 
Smith (2010; also see Katsos & Bishop, 2011; Katsos, Roqueta, Estevan, & 
Cummins, 2011). Katsos and Smith (2010) introduced the use of a Likert-
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scale to the research on underinformative sentences. A Likert-scale is a 
bipolar psychometric scale on which a participant can indicate to what 
extend he agrees or disagrees with a certain statement. Katsos and Bish-
op (2011) made their participants indicate how much they agreed with 
utterances containing the words some and all. Both children and adults 
clearly rejected utterances that were inherently false and accepted utter-
ances that had an optimal use of the words some and all. Interestingly, for 
the underinformative utterances, the answering patterns for children and 
adults were also very similar, as both groups chose the middle option on 
a 3-point Likert-scale. This is in strong contrast with Noveck (2001) were 
the answering patterns for children and adults were much more distinct, 
notwithstanding the fact that the children in this study were older. Katsos 
and Smith (2010) explain this finding with the pragmatic tolerance prin-
ciple. Children appear to be competent pragmatic comprehenders. They 
do sense the pragmatic violation when underinformative sentences are 
used. Yet due to their different tolerance levels, they do not experience 
this violation to be grave enough to be rejected. Therefore, when they 
are confronted with a binary response option, they will not reject the 
violation while adults will.
In this paper, we want to explore these results more thoroughly. 
We will make three hypotheses and investigate these in two separate 
experiments. First of all, we will vary the task method. Most of the scalar 
implicatures research relies on people’s general knowledge about the 
world. A prototypical item for example is <Some birds have wings>. 
Making use of their intrinsic knowledge, people judge this sentence and 
the scalar term and decide how to interpret it. There are however nu-
merous other ways to test scalar inferences. Pouscoulous et al. (2007) 
and others taught us that the nature of the task is of great importance. 
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We expect that when we present different tasks, children will reason 
more or less pragmatic, depending on the task difficulty. We will apply dif-
ferent methods than those used in most scalar implicature research. We 
get our inspiration from earlier research on underinformative sentences. 
For example Newstead (1989, 1995) used Euler Circles and Immediate 
Inferences in his research. These abstract testing methods should be dif-
ficult for children and thus induce more logical reasoning. We also devel-
oped more child-friendly materials like in Katsos and Bishop (2011) and 
Katsos and Smith (2010). The material existed of drawings that should be 
easier to interpret and thus induce more pragmatic reasoning in children. 
However, we expect that all three of these tasks will be easy enough for 
adults so that they will not lead to differences in pragmatic responses for 
adults.
Our second hypothesis concerns the differences in pragmatic tol-
erance between children and adults. In accordance with Katsos and Bish-
op (2011), we include both children and adults in our research. We aim 
to replicate the similarities between children and adults when scales are 
used.
Thirdly, we want to put the pragmatic tolerance principle (Katsos & 
Smith, 2010) to the test. The pragmatic tolerance hypothesis is based on 
the general assumption that a scalar term is cancellable in one direction. 
When a weaker term is used, it can be withdrawn later on and be re-
placed by the stronger term on the scale without making any violations. 
This is only possible because of the broad definition of the weaker term, 
which entails the stronger one. It is not feasible in the other direction. 
The stronger term does not include the weaker one and replacing the 
former by the latter is not semantically correct. Therefore, we think that 
looking at the opposite example of a scalar inference, in which a strong 
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term is replaced by a weaker one (which we call reversed scalar), is an 
adequate test for the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis. Katsos and his col-
leagues did not include this particular example in their studies. Noveck 
(2001) did include this particular item in his study. Although we are not 
aware of any statistical tests done on this particular item, we do see that 
accuracy levels on this item are slightly lower than on control items or 
compared to adults. 
2.2. Experiment 1
In accordance with Katsos and Bishop (2011), we include both children 
and adults in our study. We used two separate response measure con-
ditions. One group of subjects had to respond binary while the other 
groups had to respond on a scale. We expected that while adults and 
children differed in the binary condition, they would respond similarly in 
the scalar response condition. 
We decide to adjust the different types of tasks and make them 
more conformable. In the experiments carried out by Newstead, partic-
ipants were shown all the possible Euler Circles patterns together and 
they then had to indicate which of the scalar sentences were true with 
respect to them. We changed this task so that participants were always 
shown one sentence and one pattern at a time. For the Immediate In-
ferences was set up similar to this, participants could only see one de-
scriptive utterance and one sentence at any given time. As a result of the 
conformity between the different tasks that we implement, we expect 
to find correlations between the different tasks, in contrast to Newstead 
(1995). Furthermore, in order to explore the (pragmatic) tolerance con-
cept more closely, we examined both implicatures and reversed scalars.
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2.2.1. Material and methods
Thirty-seven Dutch-speaking children participated in this research 
(mean age: 10.2, range: 9-11). All children were recruited at youth sum-
mer camps. Forty-eight adults participated in the research (mean age: 29, 
range: 20-58). All adults volunteered to participate in the research. None 
of the participants had to be excluded due to bad performance.
The children received a pen and paper test. The test started with a 
cover-up story about a boy named Thomas. Thomas was still learning the 
Dutch language and the children were to indicate how precise and good 
his answers were. Children had to indicate their answers on a 5-point 
Likert-scale, with a happy smiley and a frowning smiley at the ends. For 
adults the experiment was digitalized. They also had a 5-point Likert-
scale to indicate their answers. Three different tests were used. All three 
tests had the same basic structure. We started each trial with a given 
situation: a sentence, a figure or a drawing. Then the participants were 
given a statement about the situation. They were instructed to indicate 
on the scale how well the statement described the situation given above. 
For an image of the Likert-scale, see Figure 1.
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First was the Immediate Inferences task (II). Each trial started with a 
descriptive utterance, followed by the statement that the participants had 
to judge. All the statements were about blocks in different shapes and 
colors. For example the given utterance was ‘all yellow blocks are square’ 
and the questioned statement was ‘no yellow blocks are square’.
The second task, the Euler Circles task (EC), was very similar, yet the giv-
en situation took the shape of Euler Circles. The circles were completely 
overlapping, partially overlapping or completely disconnected. Each circle 
represented a group of blocks. Again, the participants received a state-
ment about the circles and they had to judge how precise the statement 
that described the circles setting was. For an example on this, see Figure 2.
Figure 1. Example of the 5-point Likert-scale.
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For the third task, Drawings (D), we used our own method that 
was more adapted to children. For the given situation, the children were 
now shown a drawing of a real life setting, for example a birthday cake 
with candles on it. Again the children had to judge a statement about the 
setting, e.g. ‘Some of the candles on the cake are burning’. For an example 
see Figure 3. Due to the more authentic stimuli, the task became much 
easier for children.
Figure 2. Example of the Euler Circles.
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2.2.2. Results
We inverted all scores of the logically false items. This way, high scores 
on the control items, for both logically false items and optimal items, in-
dicated competent logical reasoning. We also inverted the implicatures. 
Because of this, the maximal score of five points is a pragmatic answer 
and the minimal score of one is a logical answer. We will interpret the 
pragmatic response as the most optimal and desirable response. 
We ran a repeated measures design with one between-subjects 
variables and two within-subjects variables. The between-subjects vari-
able group consisted of two levels, children and adults. The two with-
in-subjects variables were task and item-type. We had three different 
Figure 3. Example of the Drawings.
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tasks, II, EC and D. For item types we used control items (C), implicatures 
(SI) and reversed scalars (RS).
First of all, we found a main effect for task, F(2, 164) = 9.50, p < .001. 
Not all the tasks are equally difficult, as we expected. There is also a inter-
action between task and age groups, F(2, 164) = 11.80, p < .001. Paired 
t-tests indicated that the II and the EC are more difficult for children 
than the D task (II-EC: t(36) = 0.23, p = .98; II-D: t(36) = 3.09, p = .004; 
EC-D: t(36) = 3.03, p = .01). For adults, none of the t-tests showed any 
significant effects. All mean scores can be found in Table 1.
There is also a main effect for item type, F(2, 164) = 116.39, 
p < .001. Control items, implicatures and reversed scalars were signifi-
cantly different, (C-SI: t(84) = 12.51, p < .001; C-RS: t(84) = 5.48, p < .001; 
SI-RS: t(84) = 7.63, p < .001). There is an interaction effect between item 
type and age groups, F(2, 164) = 37.36, p < .001. Both adults and children 
performed well for the control items. Their average scores are significant-
Table 1. Mean scores and standard deviations for tasks and item types.
  Immediate Euler Drawings Total
  Inferences circles
 Control Items 4.19 (.63) 4.19 (.59) 4.54 (.39) 4.31 (.32)
 Implicatures 3.41 (1.26) 2.71 (1.04) 3.66 (1.02) 3.26 (.73)
 Reversed Scalars 3.7 (1.24) 3.05 (1.25) 3.36 (.94) 3.37 (.82)
 Control Items 4.78 (.31) 4.82 (.25) 4.85 (.27) 4.82 (.21)
 Implicatures 2.58 (1.55) 2.96 (1.28) 3.11 (1.46) 2.91 (1.20)
 Reversed Scalars 4.42 (.87) 4.8 (.43) 4.91 (.38) 4.71 (.35)
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ly different, t(83) = 8.82, p < .001. For the implicatures the average scores 
did not differ significantly. The manipulation of implicatures versus control 
items was successful for both children and adults. When confronted with 
a Likert-scale children and adults answered very alike. 
The interaction found between item type and age groups is ex-
plained by the reversed scalars. Only for the reversed scalars, adults and 
children answered differently. We found a significant difference, t(83) 
= 10.20, p < .001. A t-test between implicatures and reversed scalars 
shows that children interpreted the reversed scalars much like regular 
implicatures (t(36) = .897, p = .38). Adults on the other hand treated 
these reversed scalars much in the same way as the control items (t(47) 
= 1.70, p = .10). 
Finally, we found a three-way interaction between task, item type 
and group, F(4, 328)=4.946, p < .001. 
Next we found correlations between all three tasks (II-EC: r = .27, 
p = .01; II-D: r = .45, p < .001; EC-D: r = .48, p < .001). 
Adults are more consistent in their answers compared to chil-
dren. We classified participants as consistent when at least two thirds of 
their answers were similar. We found that 52.1 percent of adults were 
consistent (either logically, pragmatically or in the middle) but only 24.3 
percent of the children were consistent. Within consistent participants, 
52 percent of adults is consistently logical, 36 percent pragmatic and 
12 percent chooses the middle option. Children and adults show a sig-
nificantly different pattern of responses. A Fisher’s Exact test showed 
a two-tailed p-value of .01. Thirty-three percent of consistent children 
chose logical answers, 55 percent was pragmatic and 11 percent took 
the middle option.
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2.2.3. Discussion
The results are in line with our expectations. We looked at our three 
different interests, the comparison between the different methods, the 
comparison between children and adults and the concept of tolerance.
For the comparison of the three different methods, we found sig-
nificant correlations between all three tasks. This result is in contrast to 
Newstead (1995), who could not find a correlation between II and EC. 
As earlier mentioned, we expect that this correlation became visible due 
to the fact that we made the different tasks more conformable. Like pre-
viously mentioned, we adjusted the way in which the Euler Circles were 
presented drastically. Our alterations made a direct comparison between 
the different items less obvious. We believe that this is the reason as to 
why our results were different from Newstead (1995). Our results show 
that the different methods do test the same phenomenon. The compar-
ison we made between children and adults was very similar to the one 
found by Katsos and Bishop (2011). First of all, both adults and children 
display a significant difference between control items and implicatures. 
They chose more extreme answers for the control items than for the 
implicatures. For the control items, children differed significantly from 
adults. Because of the extreme response patterns for both children and 
adults, the variances become so small that a significant effect is obtained. 
For the implicatures, children and adults did not differ significantly. Both 
groups had average scores close to the middle of the scale. This means 
that when confronted with a Likert-scale, adults and children reason 
very alike. The difference between pragmatic adults and logical children 
disappears when confronted with Likert-scale. 
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In line with this comparison between adults and children, it does 
seem necessary to make some remarks. As mentioned earlier, only 25 
percent of children were consistent in their answers. It raises the ques-
tion how many of the children’s decisions for implicatures were based on 
deliberate thinking. Further research on the matter seems necessary. As 
long as children have these low levels of consistency, it remains difficult 
to make unambiguous conclusions.
Our final point of interest was the concept of tolerance. Is it the 
case that children only tolerate pragmatic violations or is it the case that 
children tolerate less severe violations in general more than adults? We 
found children to interpret reversed scalars in the same way as implica-
tures. Adults on the other hand treat them in the way one would expect, 
the logical way. Neither Katsos and Smith (2010) nor Katsos and Bishop 
(2011) included this type of items in their experiments. Our findings raise 
difficulties for the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis by Katsos and Smith 
(2010). Their hypothesis might have to be interpreted more broadly than 
the restricted ‘pragmatic violations’ version. The incorrect interpretations 
of reversed scalars are not a matter of pragmatic tolerance. It seems that 
a more general mechanism is at work, a more general violation tolerance 
hypothesis, a mechanism that is not restricted to pragmatic or logical vio-
lations. Children seem to apply the cancellable principle in two directions 
instead of one.
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2.3. Experiment 2 
Our second experiment was very similar to the first one. However, we 
changed our paradigm to a within-subjects design for the response mea-
sure variable, instead of a between-subjects design. It seems obvious that 
the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis should be examined with a with-
in-subjects design in which participants are confronted with a Likert-
scale as well as with the two-alternative forced choice paradigm. 
We expand the testing method used in Katsos and Bishop (2011). 
Participants will be confronted with each underinformative sentence 
twice, once with the option of responding on a Likert-scale or once with 
a two-alternative forced choice. With this research we expect to replicate 
Katsos and Bishop’s (2011) findings, namely that children do seem to de-
tect a conflict when they are confronted with underinformative sentences. 
We expect that this conflict detection will be hidden when confronted 
with a two-alternative forced choice but will become clear when they are 
confronted with the Likert-scale. Adults on the other hand, we expect to 
be fairly pragmatic with a two-alternative forced choice. When the scale 
is introduced however, we expect them to show their feelings of conflict 
about the inferences by choosing the middle options on the scale. We will 
use children around the age of eleven, congruent with Noveck (2001). Ac-
cording to this study we expect children of this age to be still much more 
logical than adults. We will not use the Immediate Inferences task again 
because we believe that the difference between the Euler Circles task and 
the Drawings task is large enough that a third task is redundant. We will 
again look at the reversed scalar and we expect that, congruent to the 
first experiment that children would treat reversed scalars similar to scalar 
implicatures while adults will treat them like control items. 
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2.3.1. Method
2.3.1.1. Subjects 
Twenty-two Dutch-speaking children participated in this research (mean 
age: 11.27; range: 11-13) and 57 adults (mean age 20.51; range 18-57 
year). The adults were first year psychology students who participated in 
exchange for course credit.
2.3.1.2. Procedure
Participants received a pen and paper test. Both children and adults re-
ceived the same tasks. Adults were also told that the test was originally 
designed for children, which would explain the childish nature of the task. 
The test started with a cover-up story about a boy named Thomas. The 
participants were told that Thomas was new in class and came from a 
foreign country. They were told he was still learning the Dutch language 
and the participants were to indicate how precise his answers were. 
They had to indicate their answers either by indicating right or wrong 
(two-alternative forced choice), or on a 5-point Likert-scale. The ends of 
the Likert-scale were illustrated with a happy smiley and a frowning smi-
ley. On the scale, the participants were to indicate how well they thought 
that the boy’s answer was, going from completely wrong to completely 
right. They were also allowed to use the middle options when the answer 
was only a little right or wrong or evenly right and wrong.
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2.3.1.3. Materials
Two different tasks were used. Both tasks had the same basic structure. 
We started each trial with a given situation. This situation was presented 
either by a figure or a drawing. Then the participants were given a state-
ment about the situation. They were instructed to indicate how well the 
statement described the situation given above. 
The first task was the Euler Circles task. Two circles in each fig-
ure were completely overlapping, partially overlapping or completely 
disconnected. Each circle represented a group of blocks, for example 
‘red blocks’, ‘square blocks’, which was written inside each circle. The par-
ticipants received a statement about the blocks and had to judge how 
precise the statement described the circles setting. For an example of 
this, see Figure 4.
Figure 4. Example of Euler Circles, drawings,  
scalar response option and binary response option.
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For the second task, we used a method that was more adapted 
to children, Drawings. For the given situation, the participants were now 
shown a drawing of a real life setting, for example a few kids playing with 
a bow and arrows. Again the children had to judge a statement about 
the setting, e.g. ‘Some arrows are shot in the bull’s-eye’. Due to the more 
authentic stimuli, this second task should, definitely for children, be much 
easier. 
2.3.2. Results
We converted the binary zero and one scores to one and five scores 
to make them comparable with the scalar responses. The children per-
formed well on both the valid and the invalid control items (M = 4.59, 
SD = .23; M = 1.28, SD = .36). This means that children understand the 
words some, all and none adequately. For the underinformative items, we 
found that the average scores were more in the middle of the scale (M = 
2.44, SD = .66). The reversed scalars were higher than we would expect 
on semantic grounds (M = 1.97; SD = .49). For more detailed results, see 
Table 2. 
We ran a repeated measures design with three within-subjects 
variables, and one between-subjects variable: age groups. There was a 
main effect for age group (F(1, 77) = 18.77, p < .001). We will explain 
this effect in light of the different interactions. We found a main effect for 
response measure (F(1, 77) = 88.43, p < .001), but no interaction with 
two groups. We found a significant effect for task (F(1, 77) = 13.72, p < 
.001), and also an interaction with age group (F(1, 77) = 26.49, p < .001). 
When we look at each task separately, we can see that adults and chil-
dren perform differently in the Euler Circles task (t(77) = 4.87, p < .001), 
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but the same on the Drawings task (t(77) = 0.94, p = .09). We also found 
a difference between the two tasks for children (t(21) = 4.01, p < .001), 
but not for adults (t(56) = 1.59, p = .12). 
There is a main effect for item (F(3, 231) = 26.49, p < .001) and 
an interaction between item type and age group (F(3, 231) = 26.49, 
p < .001). All four items are significantly different between the two age 
groups (valid: t(77) = 6.57, p < .001; invalid: t(77) = 2.40, p = .03; SI: t(77) 
= 3.44, p < .001; RS: t(77) = 5.89, p < .001). On Figure 5, we can clear-
ly see that these differences are the largest for scalar implicatures and 
Table 2. Mean ratings and standard errors for all different item types.
   Binary Scalar
Euler circles Valid control items 4.38 (.49) 4.24 (.44)
 Invalid control items 1.14 (.35) 1.35 (.63)
 Scalar implicatures 2.82 (1.52) 3.35 (1.05)
 Reversed scalars 1.54 (.67) 2.73 (.88)
Drawings Valid control items 4.93 (.24) 4.79 (.33)
 Invalid control items 1.09 (.29) 1.53 (.81)
 Scalar implicatures 1.30 (.57) 2.29 (1.11)
 Reversed scalars 1.06 (.28) 2.55 (.94)
Euler circles Valid control items 4.90 (.26) 4.82 (.32)
 Invalid control items 1 (.00) 1.08 (.27)
 Scalar implicatures 1.42 (1.01) 2.32 (.79)
 Reversed scalars 1.05 (.25) 1.77 (.69)
Drawings Valid control items 4.93 (.23) 4.88 (.23)
 Invalid control items 1.05 (.23) 1.23 (.33)
 Scalar implicatures 1.23 (.84) 2.61 (.92)
 Reversed scalars 1.05 (.35) 1.71 (.79)
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reversed scalars. We can also see that for scalar implicatures, adults are 
more pragmatic than children. For the reversed scalars, adults seem to 
be more logically correct than children, by rejecting the reversed scalars 
more than children. We also looked at the two groups separately. For 
children we found, as expected, a significant difference between the two 
types of control items (t(21) = 35.91, p < .001), and between the invalid 
control items and the scalar implicatures (t(21) = 7.94, p < .001). More 
interesting though, is that also the reversed scalars are different from the 
invalid control items (t(21) = 7.08, p < .001), as well as from the scalar 
implicatures (t(21) = 3.12, p < .001). For adults, we found the same sig-
nificant differences (valid – invalid: t(56) = 122.50, p < .001; invalid - SI: 
t(56) = 10.00, p < .001; invalid – RS: t(56) = 7.01, p < .001; SI – RS: t(56) 
= 5.88, p < .001).
Figure 5. Average responses for the four items types 
for children and adults.
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There is an interaction between measure method and task (F(1, 77) 
= 11.73, p < .001), but no interaction between response measure, task 
and age groups. There is a difference between the two tasks when par-
ticipants have to answer binary (t(78) = 3.22, p < .001) but not when 
a scalar response option is presented (t(78) = 1.12, p = .27). When an-
swering binary, the Euler Circles task (M = 2.20) seems harder than the 
Drawings task (M = 2.07). However, Figure 6 shows that this significant 
difference is a rather small difference.
Figure 6. Average responses for the two tasks  
with the two response measure.
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Both the interaction between response measure and item, and 
the interaction between these two and age groups, were significant 
(F(3, 231) = 52.77, p < .001; F(3, 231) = 8.22, p < .001). When looking 
at the individual t-test, we can see that all pairs of items with different 
response measures are significant from each other: valid control items: 
t(78) = 2.71, p < .001; invalid control items: t(78) = 3.93, p < .001; SI: 
t(78) = 8.74, p < .001; RS: t(78) = 10.00, p < .001. Both groups gave 
extreme answers for the control items for both the response measures. 
For the scalar implicatures, children gave logical answers when answer-
ing both binary and on a scale, while adults only gave logical answers 
on a scale. When answering binary, adults were extremely pragmatic. 
To confirm this, we found a significant difference between children and 
adults for the scalar implicatures when they are answering binary (t(77) 
= 3.43, p < .001), but not when they were answering on a scale (t(77) = 
1.82, p = .73). For the reversed scalar, both adults and children answered 
correctly when answering binary but for both groups, performance de-
creased when responding on a scale. Especially children became very 
erroneous when responding to reversed scalars on a scale, even more 
so than adults. Statistically they still significantly differ from each other 
(scale: t(77) = 5.04, p < .001; binary: t(77) = 3.30, p < .001). The separate 
patterns for children and adults can be found in Figures 7 and 8.
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Figure 8. Average responses for adults on the four item types  
for the two response measures.
Figure 7. Average responses for children on the four item types  
for the two response measures.
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A similar pattern is found for the task interaction (Figure 9 and 10). 
The interaction between task and item type is significant (F(1, 231) = 
35.42, p < .001), as well as the interaction between task, item type and 
age groups (F(3, 231) = 34.38, p < .001). There seems to be a signifi-
cant effect of task on most items, but not on the reversed scalars: valid 
control items: t(78) = 4.15, p < .001; invalid control items: t(78) = 2.60, 
p = .001; SI: t(78) = 2.94, p < .001; RS: t(78) = 1.98, p = .05. When we 
look at the interaction between tasks an item type for the two groups 
separately, the effect of task difficulty seems irrelevant for adults. Except 
for the invalid control items, all pairs of items between the two tasks are 
not significantly different: valid control items: t(56) = 1.06, p = .29; invalid 
control items: t(56) = 3.04, p < .001; SI: t(56) = .60, p = .55; RS: t(56) = 
.54, p = .59. Children however, are, especially on the scalar implicatures, 
influenced by this task difficulty, leading to more logical answers in the 
Euler Circles task. This task difficulty is then diminished for the reversed 
scalars (valid control items: t(21) = 6.92, p < .001; invalid control items: 
t(21) = .72, p = .48; SI: t(21) = 6.23, p < .001; RS: t(21) = 2.49, p = .02). 
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Figure 9. Average response for children on the four item types  
for the two tasks.
Figure 10. Average responses for adults on the four item types  
for the two tasks.
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There is also a three-way interaction between response measure, 
task and item (F(3, 231) = 3.68, p = .001), but there is no interaction when 
age groups is added(F(1, 77) = .84, p = .48). This three-way interaction can 
be seen in Figure 11 and 12. We can see that the difference between the 
two response measures becomes the largest when answering a scalar im-
plicature in the easier Drawings task and smaller when answering this item 
in the more difficult Euler Circles tasks. No such differences are present 
for the control items and while there is this difference between the two 
response measures on reversed scalars, task difficulty does not influence 
this. 
 
Figure 11. Average responses in the Euler Circles task  
on the four item types for the two response measures.
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Figure 12. Average responses in the Drawings task  
on the four item types for the two response measures.
 Finally, we look at the distribution of answers across the scales. 
These are presented in Figure 13. In this figure we put the valid and inval-
id control items together. We can see that for these control items, both 
groups answer with extreme answers of the scale. For the scalar implica-
tures and the reversed scalars, the three middle options are used more 
frequently. We can see that for children, answers on scalar implicatures 
are distributed fairly evenly over the five options. Adults however have 
a slightly skewed distribution in the direction of the pragmatic answers. 
It seems that both adults and children use the scale correctly to express 
a feeling of conflict. The distributions for the reversed scalars are even 
more interesting though. For adults, we see a strong preference for the 
correct response of 1, some answers for 2 or 3. Children, however, seem 
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Figure 13. Distributions of scalar responses for the different item types 
for children (top) and adults (bottom).
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to have a similar distribution as for the scalar implicatures, with an even 
stronger preference for the middle option of the scale. The extreme pos-
itive answer on the scale is barely ever picked, but the three middle op-
tions take up to 67 percent of all answers. This means that in 75 percent 
of the cases, children are semantically wrong in interpreting these items.
2.3.3. Discussion
In this second experiment we examined three hypotheses. First of all, 
we expected that children’s performance would depend on the task dif-
ficulty and that adults’ performance would not be influenced by it. More 
precisely, we expected the Euler Circles to be more difficult for children 
than the Drawings task and to lead to fewer pragmatic answers for the 
underinformative items. We did not expect this difference to be at play 
with adults. Next, we expected to replicate Katsos and Bishop’s (2011) 
findings, namely that both children and adults answer on the extremities 
of a scale when confronted with control items but are more doubtful 
when confronted with underinformative items and a scale. Thirdly, we 
looked at reversed scalars, for which one would expect both adults and 
children to reason logically and reject these sentences. 
For the first hypothesis, we can find confirmation in the main effect 
of task for children, and the interaction between task and item type and 
the interaction between task, item type and age group. For children, the 
Euler Circles task is clearly more difficult than the Drawings task. Even 
for the control items this difference is small but significant. For the scalar 
implicatures, this difference becomes even larger. The more difficult task, 
the Euler Circles, leads to more logical answers. With the easier task, the 
Drawings, children become more pragmatic. These pragmatic answers 
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are still significantly different from the control items though. For adults 
however, there is no interaction between task and item type. We only 
found a small significant difference between the two tasks for the invalid 
control items. However, this difference was very minor and negligible. 
Secondly, we found a significant effect of response measure and 
interaction with item type and an interaction with age groups. The differ-
ence between binary answers and scalar answers for the control items 
is significant. But the difference between the methods becomes much 
larger for the scalar implicatures. This confirms our hypothesis and rep-
licates Katsos and Bishop (2011). When confronted with a scalar impli-
cature, both children and adults feel that there is a conflict between the 
pragmatic and the logical interpretation of this scalar implicature. When 
they can give their response on a scale instead of a binary right or wrong, 
they have an opportunity to express this feeling of conflict. They tend 
to choose the three middle options of the scale more often (53% for 
children and 75% for adults) than when confronted with control items 
(16% and 7%). Even though we see that children are less inclined to 
use the middle options of the scale, it does rule out the possibility that 
children are just unfamiliar with the use of scales. They are adequate in 
using scales and it is for both groups a deliberate action to choose the 
middle options for the scalar implicatures and the more extreme options 
for the control items. This confirms the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis in 
that both children and adults use the scale to express that they feel the 
conflict between the logical and the pragmatic interpretation. Children 
are more logical when interpreting a scalar implicatures binary, compared 
to adults, but they get much closer to each other when they can answer 
on a scale. 
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Most surprising about our results are the reversed scalars. Neither 
the adults, nor the children, treated them the way one would expect 
based on semantic rules. Both groups seem to do reasonably well when 
they can judge the reversed scalars binary. However, when they have to 
answer on a scale, both groups, children even more than adults, seem to 
become illogical. About half of the adults and up to 67 percent of chil-
dren move over to the three middle options on the scale. 
2.4. General discussion
Our results show a clear effect of task difficulty. We can hereby confirm 
what Pouscoulous et al. (2007) and others have claimed. Task features 
can influence children’s pragmatic reasoning on underinformative sen-
tences. We noted earlier that we expect task difficulty to be the deter-
mining factor here. De Neys and Schaeken (2007) already showed that 
cognitive resources are essential for the incorporation of a scalar implica-
ture. When children are confronted with a difficult task, like Euler Circles, 
the task by itself will take up most of their available resources, leaving 
little resources for anything else than the basic default logical interpreta-
tion. Adults however have a much larger supply of cognitive resources, 
making the Euler Circles task easier to begin with. Most of them should 
have plenty of spare cognitive resources to execute a more intensive 
pragmatic reasoning process. Yet we acknowledge that another factor 
may be at work as well. The Euler Circles task is believed to rely on log-
ical reasoning skills. It might be possible that the logical interpretation is 
triggered by the general logical characteristics of the task. In this case, not 
task difficulty but the logical nature of the task would be the determining 
factor. The tasks used in this study were also very adapted to usage with 
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children. More strictly grammatical approaches to the material, instead 
of the visual child-friendly approach, might lead to different conclusions. 
More in depth research on the matter seems necessary.
Our results replicate the findings of Katsos and colleagues (Katsos 
& Bishop 2011; Katsos & Smith, 2010). We did however find a differ-
ence with conventional literature on scalar implicatures. The children in 
this study seem to be much more pragmatic than reports from other 
studies, especially with the binary responses. One explanation for this is 
probably the children’s ages. Much research on this topic used younger 
children than the ones used in this study. It is self-evident that the slightly 
older children used in this study would perform more pragmatically and 
adult-like. Moreover, the current study was conducted in Dutch. Pre-
vious research (Banga, Heutinck, Berends, & Hendriks, 2009; De Neys 
& Schaeken, 2007; Dieussaert, Verkerk, Gillard, & Schaeken, 2011, Jans-
sens, Fabry and Schaeken, 2014) on underinformative sentences with 
Dutch speaking children revealed that these children are more pragmatic 
than their English-speaking (Katsos and Bishop, 2011) or French-speak-
ing (Noveck, 2001) counterparts. Dutch speaking children seem to be 
more comparable to Spanish speaking children for example. In a study 
by Katsos et al. (2011), Spanish-speaking children rejected pragmatically 
false underinformative statements in 87% of the cases. It seems that the 
Dutch word ‘sommige’ is not the exact equal of the English word ‘some’. 
This will probably contribute to the high rate of pragmatic answers in 
Dutch-speaking children. 
The finding of the reversed scalars is not only unexpected con-
sidering semantic rules, it also opposes the pragmatic tolerance theory. 
Katsos and Smith (2010) claimed that when a scalar implicatures is pre-
sented, people have the option to make a pragmatic violation and treat 
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the inference logically. However, part of the theory is that this is only pos-
sible when a listener has the choice between a pragmatic and a logical 
interpretation. There lies no such distinction within a reversed scalar. The 
term all is used and there is only one correct interpretation of this word, 
which is both logically and pragmatically accepted. 
The pragmatic tolerance hypothesis might have to be interpreted 
more broadly than the restricted ‘pragmatic violations’ version. The in-
correct interpretations of reversed scalars are not a matter of pragmatic 
tolerance. It seems that a more general mechanism is at work, a more 
general violation tolerance hypothesis, a mechanism that is not restricted 
to pragmatic or logical violations. When people are confronted with a 
violation, which could be either logical or pragmatic or both, they will 
classify it either as correct or incorrect, using their own internal tolerance 
threshold. This tolerance threshold is individual for each person. When 
people become older and more and more semantics and pragmatics are 
incorporated, their personal tolerance threshold gets more fine-tuned. 
This would lead to a discrepancy with children, who still have a fairly 
basic knowledge of semantics and pragmatics and thus a fairly crude 
tolerance threshold. It would be interesting to find out whether and why 
reversed scalars are treated differently from other logical violations and 
similar to scalar implicatures. We expect that the gravity of an error will 
be a main factor in this. The gravity of the errors could be determined 
by two things: the relative relations between the words of Horn scales 
or the distance between the presented situation and the word used. 
If the meanings of two words of a Horn scale are close to each other, 
then their interchangeable use will be a less grave error than when the 
words are far apart in meaning. Therefore, higher levels of tolerance can 
be expected for words closer to each other. We expect that children 
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are less sensitive to logical errors than adults. Consequently, they will be 
more tolerant to these errors than adults. It then remains a question 
whether only the order of the words is important or whether there are 
also relative distances between words or words and situations that are 
important.  
In conclusion, our study mainly confirms that task features are very 
important and can influence the rates of pragmatic inferences that are 
made. The interesting interpretation of reversed scalars puts into ques-
tion the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis. It is clear to us that the pragmat-
ic tolerance hypothesis and the relationship between binary and scalar 
answers on underinformative sentences are not as straightforward and 
that more thorough research on the matter is necessary. 
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Abstract
Several studies have show it is much harder for children to interpret 
scalar implicatures in a pragmatic way than it is for adults. There have also 
been a lot of studies that have illustrated how both children and adults 
can be stimulated to reason more pragmatic or more logical. In a previ-
ous study we have shown that one way to make children more or less 
pragmatic is by changing task difficulty. Another way to influence both 
children and adults is by given them a scalar response option instead of 
a binary response option. However, the children that we have studied 
were still fairly pragmatic. In this article we will investigate a younger 
group of children: preschoolers. We used two separate tasks that differ 
in task difficulty to test their pragmatic reasoning skills on scalar implica-
tures. We expect that more pragmatic responses will be given in the eas-
ier task. The children will have to give their responses on a Likert-scale. 
We expect, congruent to previous experiments, that preschoolers will 
be aware of the conflict between the logical and the pragmatic interpre-
tation and that they will express this by using the middle options on the 
scale. We will also look at how preschoolers interpret reversed scalars. 
We expect them to, even more than the older children from our previ-
ous experiments, use the middle of the scale to interpret these items, in-
dicating that they are not regular control items. We did not find an effect 
of task difficulty in our experiment. We suspect that the tasks that we 
used were not diverse enough to have any effect. We did find an effect of 
response measure on pragmatic reasoning. Like we expected, preschool-
ers seize the opportunity of the scale to indicate the ambiguous nature 
of scalar implicatures. Finally, also as predicted, we found that reversed 
scalars were not interpreted correctly. Instead of outright rejecting these 
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items, children used the middle of the scale for their responses, indicating 
that these items have a questionable nature. 
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3.1. Introduction
A growing amount of the research on language and verbal communica-
tion focuses on pragmatic inferences. In a normal conversation, a person 
expresses more than the literal meaning of his words and sentences. 
Much information is hidden in what a person says and in most cases, a 
receiver is able to intercept this hidden information and interpret it in 
the correct way. Some of the most influential work in this area was done 
by Grice (1991). Grice makes the distinction between what a person 
literally says and what he actually means, thus, what is implicated. When a 
receiver is able to recover the hidden added meaning in what a speaker 
says, it is said that the listener makes an implicature. The receiver is able 
to make the implicature based on what he knows from the specific con-
text and situation in which the sentence is uttered. Grice believes that 
this use of implicatures is based on a general cooperative principle. This 
principle can be divided into several Maxims: information, truth, relevance 
and clarity. Give all the information that is required but not more than is 
required. Give only the truth, nothing you believe is false or for which you 
do not have any evidence. Be relevant and avoid ambiguity. Conversations 
work because each person assumes that every other person in the same 
conversation follows those same Maxims. The listener will always assume 
a speaker is not violating any Maxims. In some cases, the speaker might 
use this assumption to get some extra information across by intentionally 
violating the principle, by using an implicature. We will clarify this with an 
example: 
John: “Are you going to the birthday party?”
Adam: “I have to work”.  
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When Adam gives the answer he does, John can deduce many 
things from this answer. First of all, that Adam will not make it to the 
birthday party. The specific reason as to why he will not be able to make 
it will be because he has to work at the same time as the party. This is 
much more information than lies in the literal meaning of ‘I have to work’. 
Adam uses an implicature to get his message across and John most likely 
will understand the implicature and deduce the correct information from 
what Adam says. Nevertheless it is possible that Adam will show up at 
the party. Maybe Adam wasn’t sure yet whether a meeting would run 
late or not. He could not confirm or deny his attendance with certainty 
yet; therefore he chose to use the implicature. A characteristic of implica-
tures is that they are cancellable. Because the information is not literally 
stated but only implied, it can easily be retracted later on.  
The use of implicatures can be combined with the use of scalar 
terms, which leads to scalar implicatures. Much of the work done on 
scalar implicatures was carried out by Horn (1984, 1989). Fundamental 
to the construction of scalar implicatures are Horn scales. Horn scales 
are groups of words that can be put next to each other. The meaning of 
these words can range from weak to strong, with each word on the scale 
being slightly stronger than the word before it. An example of such a 
scale is <none, few, some, most, all>. When these words refer to a set of 
elements, we see that each word further on the scale refers to more el-
ements in that set. While the middle words on this particular scale make 
a very vague claim as to how many of the elements they refer to, there 
are also other scales that are much more specific. For example cardinal 
numbers are also a scale. For the same set of elements, this second type 
of scale can specify into much more detail how many elements are re-
ferred to. We will explain the use of scalar implicatures with an example:
Chapter 3
68
John: “I like some movies with Julia Roberts”. 
In this example John uses the word some. The person who hears 
this sentence will assume from this that John does not like all Julia 
 Roberts’ movies. Even though the semantic or logical definition of the 
word some is ‘at least one, possibly all’, most people will interpret the 
word as not all. This restricted interpretation of the word some is the 
pragmatic interpretation. Both interpretations are correct and it is up to 
the listener to choose which interpretation he will adopt. The listener will 
base his decision on the cooperative principle and his knowledge of the 
context in which the sentence is said. He will assume that the speaker 
is as informative as possible. Even though a listener knows that the pos-
sibly all interpretation is correct too, he will assume that if the speaker 
actually likes all the movies with Julia Roberts, he would have used that 
exact word. Given that the speaker uses the weaker word to express his 
thoughts, the stronger word must be inaccurate. Again this implicature is 
cancellable. It is possible that John has not seen them all, but if he did, he 
actually would have liked all of the Julia Roberts’ movies. 
The development of pragmatic reasoning has been studied in var-
ious studies. Developmental research shows that the representation of 
weak scalar terms is initially logical and only later on more pragmatic in-
terpretations get incorporated. Smith (1980) conducted a study in which 
he tested the pragmatic reasoning skills in 4- to 7-year-old children. The 
children were clearly competed in their general understanding on scal-
able terms. However, they did not seem to mind treating the word some 
as compatible with all in questions like ‘Do some birds have wings?’. A 
study by Noveck (2001) was very similar to this study. In a comparison 
between 8- and 10-year-old French-speaking children and adults (Exper-
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iment 3), he found that adults reasoned much more pragmatically than 
children. While adults rejected underinformative sentences like ‘Some 
giraffes have a long neck’ in 59 percent of the cases, 8- and 10-year-old 
children only rejected these sentences in, respectively, 11 and 15 percent 
of the cases. Guasti et al. (2005) replicated the previous study with Italian 
speaking participants (Experiment 1). The results were almost identical. 
Children rejected infelicitous sentences in 13 percent of the cases while 
adults rejected them in 50 percent of the cases. 
Papafragou and Musolino (2003) ran an experiment (Experiment 
1) in which they compared 5-year-old Greek speaking children to adults. 
They found rejection rates of 12.5 percent for children and 92.5 percent 
for adults. The difference between children and adults is even larger in 
this study, compared to the study by Noveck. We assume that this is due 
to the lower age of the children in this study compared to the 8- and 
10-year olds in Noveck. Previous studies clearly show there is a devel-
opmental trend. Children become better at pragmatic reasoning as they 
get older.  
Aside from increasing age, there are other ways to make children’s 
performances closer to adults’ performances. Several studies have unrav-
eled ways to make children more sensitive to violations of informative-
ness. In the second experiment carried out by Papafragou and Musolino 
(2003), children first ran through a training phase in which they were 
trained to better detect infelicitous items. After this training phase, rejec-
tion of scalar implicatures went up from 12.5 percent to 52.5 percent. 
The enhancement effect was confirmed by Guasti et al. (2005). Follow-
ing up on their replication of Noveck (2001), they carried out a second 
almost identical experiment, in which they included an explicit training 
phase, comparable to the one in Papafragou and Musolino. The rate at 
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which children rejected the scalar implicatures went up to 52 percent. 
However, this rejection rate dropped again to 22 percent one week 
after the initial testing and training. In a fourth experiment Guasti et al. 
changed the context in which the scalar implicatures were presented. In 
this experiment they used the same task, but this time, the stories behind 
the scalar implicatures were acted out further. This led to an elevation in 
rejection rates, for both children (73 percent) and adults (83 percent). 
This context enrichment leads to a reduction of the difference between 
children and adults. Foppolo, Guasti, and Chierchia (2012) also tested 
multiple age groups of children. They also found a clear developmental 
trend. While 4- and 5-year-old children only rejected underinformative 
items in 42 percent of the cases, 6- and 7-year olds and adults rejected 
them in around 80 percent of the cases. They were, however, also able to 
increase the rejection rates of the youngest children up to 72.5 percent 
by changing the critical word ‘some’ to ‘some of’. 
All these tasks clearly show that both the age of children and the 
way a task is presented lead to large differences in how scalar implica-
tures are interpreted. Another way to improve children’s behavior is by 
implementing different ways in which they can give their answer. A well-
known example of this is by letting children give action-based responses 
(Pouscoulous, Noveck, Politzer, & Bastide 2007). In their experiment they 
were able to increase scalar implicature production by giving 4-, 5-, and 
7-year olds as well as adults an action-based task. In an elegant simple 
task they requested that all/some/no boxes presented in front of the 
participants contain a token. When in the pre-trial set-up of the boxes 
all the boxes already contained a token, and participants were asked 
that some of the boxes had tokens, they had two options. When they 
reasoned pragmatically, they would take away at least one token. When 
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they reasoned logically, they could leave the set-up as it was. This task in-
creased implicature production across all ages. In 68 percent of the cases, 
4-year-old children would change the tokens and reason pragmatically, as 
opposed to 9 percent in a classic truth value judgment task. 
Another way to alter the way participants responded was imple-
mented by Katsos and colleagues (Katsos & Bishop, 2011; Katsos, Roque-
ta, Estevan, & Cummins, 2011; Katsos & Smith, 2010). Instead of answer-
ing binary like in a classic truth value judgment task, participants were 
now asked to answer on a Likert-scale. By doing this, Katsos and Bishop 
(2011) were able to increase the pragmatic responses in 5- and 6- year-
old children from 26 percent (Experiment 1) up to 100 percent (Exper-
iment 2). From this 100 percent, 89 percent was placed on the middle 
of the 3-point scale. This shows that children do not necessarily reject 
these pragmatically incorrect sentences, but that they are in fact sensitive 
to the ambiguous nature of the items. These results were also replicated 
with 6- and 7- year-old children (Katsos & Smith, 2010). Katsos and Bish-
op also made a comparison to adults and for adults they found that they 
chose the first, middle and third option on the scale for the incorrect 
control items, scalar implicatures and correct control items respectively. 
They also found that there was no longer a significant effect between 
the children and adults on this task. Katsos and Smith (2010) explained 
this effect with the Pragmatic Tolerance hypothesis. They believe that 
even young children are in fact competent pragmatic comprehenders, 
but they have different tolerance thresholds. Based on this threshold, 
children and adults make decisions about which pragmatic violations are 
acceptable and which are not. There is a difference between children 
and adults for the strictness of this threshold, with that of children being 
much more loose and tolerable. Some particular pragmatic violations 
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will be more acceptable to children compared to adults, while others will 
not. However, when participants have to answer binary, this tolerance to-
wards pragmatic violations will be hidden. Katsos and Smith believe that 
it is not necessarily the children’s pragmatic reasoning skills that improve 
with age, but more that their individual pragmatic violations threshold 
further develops towards that of adults.
In a previous study we replicated these findings from Katsos and 
colleagues. In the first experiment of our study (Pipijn & Schaeken, 2012), 
we conducted a study between Dutch-speaking 9- to 11-year-old chil-
dren and adults, in which they gave participants a 5-point scale to rate 
the sentences. However, they changed the types of tasks in which the 
scalar implicatures were presented. Parallel to Newstead (1989, 1995), 
two tasks were included in the experiment: Immediate Inferences and 
Euler Circles. Another task, Drawings, was also included in the experi-
ment. These three tasks vary in their difficulty level. The authors expect-
ed, especially for children, that these differences in difficulty would lead 
to differences in the performance on scalar implicatures. More precisely, 
they expected the more difficult tasks, Immediate Inferences and Euler 
Circles, to lead to fewer pragmatic answers. The results were as expect-
ed, the easiest task, Drawings, led to the most pragmatic answers for 
children. For adults, there was no effect of task difficulty. The compari-
son between adults and children was the same as in Katsos and Bishop 
(2011), children and adults perform similarly on the scalar implicatures 
when they could answer on a scale. 
In the second experiment of our study (Pipijn & Schaeken, 2012), 
we conducted a very similar experiment, but this time a within sub-
jects comparison was made. Again, adults were compared to 11- to 
13-year-old children. However, this time all subjects had to respond to 
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each item twice, once in a two-alternative forced choice task, and once 
on a 5-point Likert-scale. The Euler Circles task and the Drawings task 
were used to look at the effect of task difficulty. When answering binary 
in the two-alternative forced choice task, children reasoned more log-
ically about scalar implicatures than adults. However, when these same 
subjects had to rate these same items on a 5-point scale, the difference 
between adults and children disappeared. Adults in this experiment were 
not influenced by the task difficulty. Children however, became more 
logical in the more difficult task, Euler Circles, and more pragmatic in the 
easier task, Drawings. All these results are in line with one could expect 
from the literature. 
One aspect of these two studies was unexpected though. In both 
studies, the opposite of a scalar implicatures was included, which is re-
ferred to as a reversed scalar. Reversed scalars occur when a some-sit-
uation is presented and a participant is asked whether an all-sentence 
would be a good description of this situation. For example when some-
one is asked whether “All teachers have glasses”, this sentence is obvi-
ous false as only ‘some teachers have glasses’. Both the semantic and 
pragmatic definition of the word all state that it entails a whole quan-
tity, each and every one. When one or more elements are missing, the 
word all does not apply anymore. Therefore one would assume that 
these types of sentences are always rejected in both the experiments 
described above and would not be different from the other used control 
items. However, they were not. In our previous study, the judgment of 
reversed scalars by children was significantly different from the judgment 
of the incorrect control items. In the first experiment, there was no 
significant difference between the reversed scalars and the actual scalar 
implicatures. For adults, the reversed scalars were not significantly dif-
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ferent from the incorrect control items. In the second experiment, both 
children and adults rated the reversed scalars somewhere between the 
scalar implicatures and the incorrect control items. However, this only 
occurred when participants had to answer on a scale. When participants 
had to answers binary, judgments dropped considerably for both adults 
and children. One could argue that this is due to a limited understanding 
of the terms some and all, but results on the control items clearly show 
that both adults and children are adequate comprehenders of these 
scalar terms and of the task in general. 
In this paper, we want to further explore these findings. To do this, 
we will look at the performance of preschoolers in these tasks. We will 
test 5-year-old children in our study and we will use the same tasks as used 
in the two previous experiments: Euler Circles and Drawings. Again, we 
will make a within-subjects comparison with the two response methods: 
binary and scales. The main motivation for testing children of this age is 
the generally high level of pragmatic reasoning in Dutch-speaking children. 
The previous two experiments clearly showed that Dutch-speaking chil-
dren are more pragmatic than their French, Greek or Italian counterparts. 
Subtle language differences seem to lead to different interpretations of 
the words some (English), sommige (Dutch), certain (French), qualche 
(Italian) and Merika (Greek). We believe it would be interesting to make 
a comparison between the previous two experiments in which adults 
and older children were tested, and the preschoolers in the current ex-
periment. Secondly, we also believe it would also be interesting to make 
a comparison with the 5-year-old children that were tested in Katsos and 
Bishop (2011). We want to see if we can replicate their findings, and again, 
we want to make the within-subjects comparison that those authors did 
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not. We think it will also be interesting to see how Dutch-speaking chil-
dren respond compared to children in other languages.
We expect to replicate the findings from Katsos and Bishop 
(2011) and our own previous experiments, namely that children, even as 
young as 5 years old, do seem to have the ability to reason pragmatically 
when the task is adjusted. We expect there will be a significant difference 
between their binary responses and scalar responses, with the scalar 
responses being more pragmatic than the binary. We also expect the 
responses to be less pragmatic overall than those of the older children in 
our previous studies. We also expect to find a task difficulty effect, with 
the more difficult task, Euler Circles, leading to fewer pragmatic respons-
es than the easier task, Drawings. Finally, we expect these young children 
to treat reversed scalars differently from other control items. We expect 
this effect to be even more robust than it was for older children.
3.2. Method
3.2.1. Participants
Thirty-four Dutch-speaking preschoolers participated in the experiment, 
all assembled from the same elementary school. The children were be-
tween the ages of five and seven years old (M = 5.38, SD = .55). Eigh-
teen girls and sixteen boys participated. We had to exclude five children 
from the analysis due to bad performance on the control items. All the 
children that were included in the analysis had at least 75 percent of the 
control items correct.
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3.2.2. Procedure
The experiments were done individual. The children were told a cov-
er story with a doll called ‘Professor Bamboozle’. They were said that 
the professor was going to say some sentences. The professor would 
sometimes try to fool them by saying sentences that were not right. The 
children were to indicate if the professor said something right or wrong. 
Then they could reward him by giving him candy. They could choose to 
give him 0 to 4 pieces of candy, depending on how right or wrong they 
thought the sentence was. Each child was presented each item twice, 
once when they had to reward him with candy, and once when they had 
to say whether the professor said something right of wrong. There were 
two separate tasks, the Euler Circles task and the Drawings. The Euler 
Circles task was always presented first, the Drawings second. This was 
done deliberately because of the limited attention span of 5-year olds 
and the difficulty levels of the two tasks. The number of items was limited 
to make sure the task was not too long for the children.
3.2.3. Materials
In the Euler Circles task, the children were presented with two large cir-
cles in which several Attribute Logic Blocks were put down. The two cir-
cles were either completely separated, one completely within the other, 
or partly overlapping. Professor Bamboozle would say a sentence about 
the blocks laid out in front on the children. Children then had to say how 
well that sentence described the situation in front of them. To make the 
task easier and more appropriate for 5-year-old children we used actual 
block instead of the more abstract version of the task with words like 
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‘Red blocks’, like it was done in previous experiments (Pipijn & Schaek-
en, 2012). With this alteration, the use of the circles became redundant. 
However, we kept the circles in the experiment to make the task as sim-
ilar as possible with those previous studies to make a comparison. There 
were six control items; these were either inherently correct or incorrect. 
We also presented two scalar implicatures and two reversed scalars. 
An example of a scalar implicature can be seen in Figure 1. The correct 
sentence for this example would be ‘All round blocks are red’. The use of 
the word some is underinformative in this example. 
An example of a reversed scalar can be seen in Figure 2. In this ex-
ample, the correct sentence would be ‘Some round blocks are red’. The 
use of the word all is wrong, because the meaning of word is broader 
than the situation actually is.  
Figure 1. Example of a scalar implicature in the Euler Circles task.
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For the Drawings task we used child-friendly drawings in which 
a small situation is outlined. Then Professor Bamboozle asks a question 
about the drawing. Nine control items were included, which were clearly 
right of clearly wrong. Figure 3 is an example of such a correct control 
item. We included three scalar implicatures and three reversed scalars. 
Figure 2. Example of a reversed scalar in the Euler Circles task.
Figure 3. Example of a valid control items in the Drawings task.
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We had a total of 25 items and each items had to be rated twice, 
once when the children had to answer with right of wrong (binary re-
sponse) and once when they could give the more nuanced answer (sca-
lar response). 
3.3. Results
The binary zero and one scores were converted to one and five scores 
to make them comparable with the scalar responses. The children per-
formed well on both the valid and the invalid control items (M = 4.74, 
SD = .29; M = 1.24, SD = .25). This means that the children understand 
the words some, all and none adequately. For the underinformative items, 
we found that the average scores were more in the middle but slightly 
leaning towards logical answers (M = 3.73, SD = .89). The reversed sca-
lars were also rated relatively high, which is unexpected based on seman-
tic grounds (M = 2.83; SD = .91). For more detailed results, see Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Mean ratings and standard errors for all different item types.
 Scalar responses Binary responses
 Euler circles Drawings Euler circles Drawings
Valid control Items 4.51(.59) 4.85 (.20) 4.64 (.51) 4.97 (.15)
Invalid control Items 1.17 (.38) 1.48 (.48) 1.00 (.00) 1.31 (.54)
Scalar implicatures 3.76 (1.20) 3.59 (1.24) 3.97 (1.38) 3.62 (1.53)
Reversed scalars 3.19 (1.15) 2.84 (.76) 3.00 (1.51) 2.29 (1.49)
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We ran a repeated measures design with three within-subjects fac-
tors, namely response measure (binary vs. scalar), task (Euler Circles vs. 
Drawings) and item type (valid control items, invalid control items, scalar 
implicatures, reversed scalars). There were no main effects for response 
measure or task. There was however a main effect for item (F(3, 84) = 
175.85, p < .001). We compared the different items individually and they 
were all significantly different from each other (see Table 2). As expected, 
the valid and the invalid control items were significantly different from 
each other. More interesting is that the reversed scalars are significantly 
different from the invalid control items. The scalar implicatures were sig-
nificantly different from all other item types. 
There was no significant interaction between response measure 
and task. There was a significant interaction between response measure 
and item type (F(3,84) = 7.54, p < .001). We looked at the t-test be-
tween the two measure methods for each individual item. There was a 
significant difference between the two response measures for the con-
trol items and for the reversed scalars (valid control items: t(28) = 4.24, p 
< .001; invalid control items: t(28) = 2.76, p < .001; reversed scalars: t(28) 
Table 2. T-test between all different item types and the significance levels.
 t (28) p-value 
Valid - Invalid 45.51 < .001
Valid - SI 6.07 < .001
Valid - RS 11.36 < .001
Invalid - SI 14.22 < .001
Invalid - RS 10.52 < .001
SI - RS 4.82 < .001
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= 2.50, p = .02). There was no significant difference between the two re-
sponse measures on the scalar implicature items (t(28) = 1.00, p = .33). 
The interaction between task and item type was also significant 
(F(3,84) = 19.89, p < .001). When looked at the different t-tests, it seems 
that task makes a difference on the control items and a marginal differ-
ence on the reversed scalars, but not on the scalar implicatures (valid 
control items: t(28) = 3.43, p < .001; invalid control items: t(28) = 3.69, 
p < .001; scalar implicatures: t(28) = 0.76, p = .46; reversed scalars: t(28) 
= 2.02, p = .05). 
Figure 4. Average responses on all item types  
for the two response measures.
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Finally, we did not find a significant three-way interaction between 
response measure, task and item type (F(3, 84) = 1.01, p < .39). We also 
looked at the distribution of responses across the scale, for the scalar re-
sponse measure condition. For the control items, children answer mainly 
on the two extreme ends of the scale. We see an excess number of 
answers on five compared to one, but this is due to an unequal number 
of valid and invalid control items. For the scalar implicatures, we see that 
in 63 percent of the cases, children still choose the extreme values. Most 
interesting is the distribution for the reversed scalars. Purely semantical-
ly, we would expect most of the answers to be with one, which is the 
correct answer for these items. However, only 20 percent of children 
choose the correct item. The middle answer on the scale is chosen the 
most. This clearly indicates that for 5-year-old children, reversed scalar 
items are not necessarily wrong.  
Figure 5. Average responses on all item types for the two tasks.
The Pragmatic Tolerance Hypothesis in preschoolers
83
3.4. Discussion
We had three main hypotheses for this study. First of all, we expected to 
find an effect of task difficulty. We expected more difficult tasks to lead to 
fewer pragmatic responses on scalar implicatures. Secondly, we expected 
an effect of response measure. We expected the children in our exper-
iment to become more pragmatic when they had to answer on a scale 
instead of binary. We expected these results to be similar to the results 
from Katsos and Bishop (2011). We also expect the 5-year-old children 
tested in this experiment to be less pragmatic than older children tested 
in other experiments. Finally, we expected children to treat reversed 
scalars differently from other control items. 
We did not find a main effect of task, but we did find an interaction 
of task with item type. T-tests revealed that this interaction was due to 
differences between the two tasks on the control items and on the re-
versed scalars. However, for the scalar implicatures, where we expected 
to find a difference, there was no difference between the two tasks. On 
Table 3. Distribution of responses for the different item types.
 Controle items Scalar implicatures Reversed scalars 
1 .28 .17 .20
2 .04 .07 .09
3 .05 .15 .38
4 .06 .14 .19
5 .57 .46 .14
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Figure 5 we saw that the easier task, Drawings, led to more pragmatic re-
sponses but this effect was not significant. We could hypothesize that the 
two tasks that we used in the experiment were maybe too difficult for 
5-year-old children. However, we only used the children that performed 
well on the control items. It is possible that by excluding the children that 
performed poorly on the control items, we excluded those children for 
whom task difficulty would matter. Therefore we ran an analysis with the 
lower half of the participants but this did not change the results. Maybe 
it is possible that the tasks were not too difficult for the children, but 
still difficult enough that the burdening was at maximum and no extra 
resources were available to make the difference between the two tasks. 
But again this is very unlikely. With average scores between 3.5 and 4, still 
a fair number of the responses given were pragmatic. It seems that the 
children did have enough resources available to make some pragmatic 
responses. It is not clear to us why then we did not find an effect of task 
on the scalar implicatures while we did find it with older children. We 
would expect the effect of task difficulty to become larger for younger 
children for whom the tasks are more difficult than for the older children. 
The only reasonable argument would be that the two tasks were equal 
on the difficulty level. Even though we did find significant effects of task 
on the control items, the direction of these effects was opposite for the 
valid compared to the invalid control items. A t-test, in which the two 
types of control items are combined, does not show an effect of task 
on control items any more. The reason as to why we did not find a task 
effect while it was present in previous studies might be the alterations 
in the Euler Circles task. We altered the task by changing the abstract 
descriptions of blocks by actual blocks. This made the task easier for the 
5-year-old children, but it is very likely that this also made the difference 
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in task difficulty between the Euler Circles task and the Drawings task 
completely disappear. The way we designed the task, the actual circles 
became redundant and the decision could be made solely on the blocks. 
The circles might even have been an extra aid that made logical reason-
ing less necessary and that made the task easier for the children. When 
there is no difficulty difference any more between the two tasks, it is only 
natural that there is no effect of task either.
The results that we found concerning response measure were 
very similar to the results found in Katsos and Bishop (2011). Children 
outright rejected 17 percent of the scalar implicatures when answering 
on the scale. We found an interaction effect of response measure and 
item type. However, a more in-depth analysis of this interaction revealed 
that there was no response measure effect for the scalar implicatures. 
When answering binary, children were still fairly logical with 69 percent 
of all answers being logical. If we include every answer from 1 to 3 on 
the scale as an indication of a pragmatic answer, logical answers are re-
duced to 24 percent. Even though there is no effect of measure on scalar 
implicatures, we do interpret these numbers in the sense that response 
measure does in fact have its impact. When confronted with a scale, chil-
dren will express their conflicting feelings about the scalar implicatures 
by using the full range of the scale. One could question whether this is 
in fact a deliberate strategy instead of the expression of increased un-
certainty caused by the scale. Perhaps a 5-point scale is too difficult for 
these young children. Katsos and Smith (2010) also used a 5-point scale 
but they used this scale with older children. In Katsos and Bishop (2011) 
they also used 5-year-old children, but then they used a 3-point scale. It is 
possible that the combination of 5-year-old children and a 5-point scale 
was not an optimal decision. However, the distribution of the responses 
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for the control items clearly shows that even 5-year-old children are 
proficient in using this scale to answer and the use of the middle options 
on the scale does seem like a deliberate strategy.
This deliberate strategy is even further emphasized by the reversed 
scalars. Even though these particular items are semantically speaking con-
trol items, children judge these items significantly different from the other 
control items. Like we expected from previous studies, the responses on 
the reversed scalars lie closer to the scalar implicatures than to the con-
trol items. In this study, 80 percent of the answers are actually incorrect, 
with a clear preference for the middle option on the scale. These results 
put into question what we assume about scalar implicatures, namely that 
one can only make the implicature in one direction and not the other. 
Children in this study and in the previous one, clearly use the words 
some and all interchangeable in two directions instead of one. It also puts 
into question the pragmatic tolerance hypotheses by Katsos and Smith 
(2010). Partly our results confirm their speculation; children do seem to 
have an early understanding of pragmatics. However, it does not seem 
to be an individual threshold for pragmatic violations that develops over 
age. Instead, we believe it is more a threshold for violations in general 
that develops over age. It seems that especially young children have a 
very loose opinion about how much one should follow semantic rules, 
about what is acceptable and what is not. We propose a more general 
violation tolerance principle. 
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Abstract
Children and adults seem to interpret scalar implicatures in a different 
way. Research with a scalar response measure however has shown that 
children and adults are more alike than a binary response measure re-
veals. The pragmatic tolerance hypothesis has been proposed to explain 
this phenomenon but unfortunately this theory does not explain how 
children interpret reversed scalars. We therefore propose a broader 
violation tolerance hypothesis and claim that children have an overall 
higher tolerance for violations, independent of whether they are logical 
or pragmatic violations, than adults. We used a testing paradigm in which 
adults had to rate scalar implicatures, reversed scalars and control items, 
which enabled us to distinguish between the two theories. Results of the 
study did not favor the violation tolerance hypothesis over the pragmatic 
tolerance hypothesis.  
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4.1. Introduction
Verbal communication is one of the cornerstones of human civilization 
and is one of the most important aspects of our daily lives. Various as-
pects of linguistics have been studied for centuries yet one particular 
aspect has gained popularity in recent years: scalar implicatures. Consider 
the following example:
Some of the players in the World Cup final played well.
When a person utters this sentence, you can deduce many different 
things about it. For example, you might assume that the person watched 
the final game of the World Cup. You will probably also deduce that 
the person thinks that not all the players played well and that there is 
at least one player that did play well and one that didn’t. However, it is 
also possible that the person did not actually watch the game and only 
read some articles about it, in which case he might have read something 
about certain players’ performances, but not about others. In this case it 
is possible that he used ‘some of the players’ because he does not have 
information about all the players. So it is clear that there are two alterna-
tive interpretations of this sentences that are both equally correct.
Some and possibly all players in the World Cup final played well.
Some but not all players in the World Cup final played well.
It is up to the listener to decide which of these two interpretations he or 
she will adhere to. To make this decision, the listener will use all his pri-
or knowledge and context information. The listener knows for example 
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that the speaker despises soccer and definitely did not see the final. Or 
perhaps the sentence is uttered in a bar right after both the speaker and 
listener watched the game together attentively. The listener will incorpo-
rate all this information while interpreting the sentences. Incorporating 
all this extra context information is what we call pragmatics. It is obvi-
ous that interpreting this sentence is much more than processing all the 
semantic information the correct way, pragmatics is clearly another im-
portant part. In this particular example, we saw an illustration of a scalar 
implicature. Grice (1991) introduced a theory that explains these prag-
matic circumstances. Grice believes that people obey certain ‘rules’ when 
communicating, which he calls ‘Maxims’. For example there is the Maxim 
of Quantity: Make your contribution to a conversation as informative as 
required. For our example this means that the speaker needs to give all 
the information he has and be as informative as he can be. However, he 
also needs to obey the Maxim of Quality which limits him to only give 
information that he knows is true. For our example this means that our 
speaker cannot use the term all if he is not absolutely sure that it is cor-
rect. If we assume that the speaker is applying both these maxims, then 
the initial statement needs to be interpreted with the ‘not all’ meaning. 
The correct interpretation is implicated by the speaker.
The reason why this type of implicature is called a ‘scalar’ implica-
ture goes back to the work by Horn (1984, 1989). According to Horn, 
the derivation of this type of implicatures is based on so-called Horn 
scales. Examples of these of scales are <some, all>, <possible, certain> 
and <warm, hot>. Typical about these types of scales is that each word 
further on the scale is entailed by the weaker previous word on the 
scale. The word all is stronger than the word some and it is entailed by 
it. This works only in one direction. All does not entail some. The word 
An investigation of the violation tolerance hypothesis
93
some literally means ‘at least one and possibly all’ so all is entailed in the 
definition. When a person uses a less informative word of a scale in a 
sentence, it is probably the case that the stronger word is not the case. If 
it were, and the speaker obeys Grice’s Maxims then he would have used 
the stronger word. Therefore, the best way to interpret the weaker term 
would be in the meaning that excludes the stronger term, which is also 
called the pragmatic interpretation. These interpretations go far beyond 
the semantic meaning of what is said. Pragmatics plays a large role and 
communication is clearly not only about what is said, but maybe even 
more about what is not said.
Research on the development and the general mechanics behind 
scalar implicatures has really lifted off after a study conducted by Noveck 
(2001). Noveck conducted a developmental study in which children and 
adults had to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed with statements. 
The critical statement in the study was an underinformative item that 
could be interpreted either in a logical fashion or in a pragmatic fashion. 
In his third experiment he copied a study conducted by Smith (1980) 
in which sentences like ‘Some giraffes have long necks’ are presented to 
participants. There are two ways to interpret this sentence, the logical 
way (Some and possible all giraffes have long necks) and the pragmatic 
way (Some but not all giraffes have long necks). The results showed a 
clear discrepancy between children and adults in how they interpret this 
sentence, with up to 87 percent of children accepting this statement 
while only 47 percents of adults do so. Adults appear to be more likely 
than children to enrich the interpretation of the world some to some and 
not all and reject these types of statements.
More recently, Noveck and Sperber (2007) wrote a review on 
theoretical and developmental aspects of scalar implicatures. The devel-
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opmental studies discussed in the review (Guasti et al., 2005; Papafragou 
& Musolino, 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004) point into the direction 
that children are less capable of making pragmatic inferences than adults. 
When the circumstances are right, however, children’s performance can 
be improved, for example when they are given sufficient training. Still, a 
significant difference with adults remains. It seems that making pragmatic 
inferences requires more effortful processing from children than it does 
from adults and when confronted with a weaker scalar term, children will 
be more likely to give a logical interpretation of the term as opposed to 
a pragmatic one.
In 2011, Katsos and Bishop were able to make the differences 
between children and adults disappear. In an earlier study, Katsos and 
Smith (2010) found that when children had to rate scalar inferences on a 
5-point Likert-scale, a majority of the children chose the middle options 
of the scale, expressing their sensitivity to the underinformative nature of 
the scalar impressions. In the 2011 study (Katsos & Bishop, 2011), a com-
parison with adults was made. All participants in the study were shown 
a story that was narrated by a fictional character. The participants then 
had to rate a statement uttered by the fictional character. This statement 
would be optimal, false or underinformative. In a first experiment, the 
participants had to give a binary response. In the second experiment, 
they had to give a scalar response, on a 3-point Likert-scale. In the first 
experiment with the binary responses, the researchers found a signif-
icant difference between children and adults on the underinformative 
responses. In the second experiment however, this significant difference 
between the children and the adults disappeared. These studies clearly 
show that children are sensitive to the ambiguous nature of scalar impli-
catures but that a two-alternative forced choice paradigm, which is used 
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in most common scalar implicatures studies, is not adequate to expose 
this sensitivity.
We were able to replicate these findings. In the first experiment 
of one of our studies (Pipijn & Schaeken, 2012) we looked into the ef-
fects of scalar response options on the interpretation of underinforma-
tive items with three different tasks. We replicated the results found by 
Katsos and colleagues; we did not find a significant difference between 
children and adults when interpreting scalar implicatures with a Likert-
scale. We used three different tasks to play with the task difficulty. The 
effect of the scalar response options seemed to be robust and did not 
alter with the task difficulties. In the second experiment we conducted 
a within-subjects experiment in which each participant had to rate sen-
tences both binary and on a scale. We tested both children and adults, 
on two different tasks that varied in difficulty level. Consistent with the 
literature we found that children and adults interpret scalar implicatures 
differently when they have to give binary responses. This difference dis-
appears when they have to give the answers on a scale. Adults seem not 
to be influenced by the task difficulty but children are. Especially when 
they have to give scalar ratings of underinformative items, a difficult task 
leads them to be more logical than with an easier task. This effect is con-
sistent with what we could expect from previous research and what we 
previously said; making scalar implicatures requires more cognitive effort 
from children than it does from adults and this becomes clear when you 
compare performances on a difficult and an easier task.
These studies and the studies by Katsos and colleagues (Katsos 
& Bishop, 2011; Katsos, Roqueta, Estevan, & Cummins, 2011; Katsos & 
Smith, 2010) clearly show that children do have the required sensitivity 
to interpret weak scalar terms in a pragmatic fashion. Yet, it remains the 
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question why this sensitivity does not show in classic binary response 
paradigms. Katsos and colleagues came up with a theory that explains 
these findings very well, called the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis (Kat-
sos & Bishop, 2011).
The starting point of this theory is that in order to pragmatically 
reject underinformative sentences, a participant does not only need to 
have the sensitivity to notice the under-informativeness of a scalar term, 
the participant also needs to classify this use of scalar terms as a violation. 
We call these two steps pragmatic competence and pragmatic tolerance. 
It is possible that a person notices this underinformative use, but does 
not classify it as a violation. Even more, it is possible that the person 
classifies it as a violation, but not as a violation grave enough to outright 
reject it. So when a person accepts the underinformative use of a weak 
scalar term in a binary task paradigm, there is no way of knowing wheth-
er this acception is due to insensitivity or due to a classifying decision. The 
use of Likert-scales gives a solution to this problem and the previously 
mentioned studies show it is not an otiose remedy. When participants 
are confronted with this scale, it gives them the perfect tool to express 
this sensitivity.
There are two possible types of violations in the items that we 
used: logical ones and pragmatic ones. The logical ones are straightfor-
ward and lie in the semantics of the scalar terms. When a strong term 
with a delimited meaning is used to describe a situation that is not en-
tailed in the meaning of the word, it is incorrect in any way you look at 
it. For example saying ‘all cats have wings’ is logically incorrect because no 
cats have wings. The pragmatic violations are more vague and lie in the 
wide meanings of the weaker scalar terms. When a weak term is used to 
describe a stronger situation that might, but does not have to, be entailed 
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in the weaker term, there is not a clear-cut right or wrong answer. For 
example saying ‘some cats have whiskers’ when in fact all cats have whis-
kers. Instead there are two ways to look at it and it depends on context 
or personal preference to interpret the scalar term and the situation. For 
example when the whiskers of a cat are cut, a person can see this as a 
cat without whiskers while another person might not see it that way be-
cause the cat was born with them in the first place. These two variables 
give rise to the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis. It is up to each partici-
pant to draw the line as to what is or is not acceptable to him. Katsos and 
colleagues call this personal threshold for acceptable and inacceptable 
violations a tolerance. They believe this tolerance does not apply to log-
ical violations because there are no vague interpretations possible. The 
tolerance is only applicable on pragmatic violations. The location of the 
threshold will be different for adults and children. For children, who still 
have a limited understanding of language and especially pragmatics, this 
threshold is fairly high and they are tolerable. Adults on the other hand 
are more experienced thinkers and linguists and therefore their thresh-
old will be stricter and less tolerable. When both children and adults are 
confronted with a pragmatic violation like an underinformative use of a 
weak scalar term, adults will therefore classify this violation as too grave 
a violation and reject it while children might not. This leads to different 
response patterns for children and adults when they have to respond 
binary. Even though they might both experience the conflict between 
the logical and the pragmatic interpretation in the same way, their indi-
vidual thresholds will lead to opposite response patterns. When they can 
answer on a scale though, both children and adults have a lot more op-
tions to express their sensitivity. They will both express their conflicting 
feelings by using the middle options on the scale. By doing this, they can 
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acknowledge that there are two conflicting interpretations but that one 
is not necessarily better than the other.
This hypothesis by Katsos and colleagues is elegant and easily ex-
plains for all the scalar data they found. It does not however explain all 
the data that were found in our previous experiments (Pipijn & Schaek-
en, 2012; Pipijn & Schaeken, 2013). In these two studies, we did not only 
investigate scalar implicatures, we also investigated something we call 
reversed scalars. Reversed scalars are what most other studies consid-
er being one of the various control items. It is the reverse of a normal 
scalar implicature. More specifically, a reversed scalar is an item in which 
a strong scalar term is used to describe a situation in which a weaker 
term would have been appropriate. An example of this would be when 
someone says ‘All dogs are brown’. The stronger term all is used but the 
weaker term some would have been correct because there are also black 
dogs for example. In our studies we found that for children, these items 
are equally conflicting as scalar implicatures. We found that children rated 
reversed scalars different from other control items in that they used the 
middle of the scale to rate them. When children had to respond binary, 
they were clearly aware that these items were incorrect, yet the scalar 
responses do point in the direction of some sort of ambiguity. Adults also 
clearly rejected these items when responding binary. When responding 
with scalar responses, they also showed a small reluctance to outright re-
ject these items. Their average scores were lower than those of children, 
but still, they did show some minor uncertainty about these items.
These findings cannot be explained by the pragmatic tolerance 
hypothesis. The errors made by the participants were logical semantic 
errors and this type of violation does not fall under the pragmatic toler-
ance hypothesis. Therefore we propose a revision of the hypothesis and 
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we advocate a more general violation tolerance hypothesis. We believe 
that not only pragmatic violations are judged by a personal violation 
tolerance threshold, but also all sorts of violations are proportioned to 
a tolerance threshold, including logical violations. For adults the gravity of 
a logical violation will be much larger than the gravity of a pragmatic vio-
lation. For children, the difference between the two will be much smaller. 
While a pragmatic violation that is rated at the middle of the scale might 
be either accepted or rejected binary, a logical violation that is rated at 
the middle of the scale, will be rejected without a doubt. For adults the 
logical violation is so grave to begin with, that even on a scale, is raises 
little doubt.
In this paper we will attempt to explore this hypothesis. To do 
this, we used a paradigm that enables us to vary the magnitude of a 
violation, which should allow us to explore the violation tolerances. We 
got inspiration from a study conducted by van Tiel (2014). In a study on 
embedded scalars and typicality, van Tiel (2014) used a paradigm that is 
very suited to test our hypothesis. We made some minor modifications 
to the paradigm to make a comparison with our previous studies possi-
ble. In the experiment we will use a set of pictures with black and white 
dots, in which we will vary the ratios of black and white dots. Then we 
will ask participants whether they agree with statements about the dots. 
These statements will contain the words all, some and none. Participants 
will give their responses on 5-point Likert-scales. The largest difference 
between our study and the study by Van Tiel is that we also included the 
word none. These items are crucial to make a distinction between the 
pragmatic tolerance theory and our violation tolerance theory, which we 
will explain further on.
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Purely based on semantic theories, we would expect participants 
to use the top rating of the scale if the word all is combined with a situa-
tion in which all the dots are black and if the word none is combined with 
a situation with no black dots. For all other combinations of these words 
and dots ratios, we would expect them to pick the lowest option on the 
scale. For the sentence with the word some we expect them to pick the 
lowest point on the scale when there are no black dots and we expect 
them to pick the top of the scale for all other black and white dots ratios, 
except for the situation in which all the dots are black. This particular item 
is the scalar implicature because although the word all would be better 
suited, the some term is not necessarily incorrect. Therefore all options 
on the Likert-scale are acceptable for this particular item.
If we would base our predictions on our violation tolerance hy-
pothesis however, they would slightly alter. For the items in which the all 
term is used, we expect a small positive slope in mean ratings as the ratio 
of black and white dots goes up. For the sentences with the word none 
we expect the same but in the other direction, namely, a small negative 
slope in mean ratings when the ratio of black and white dots goes up. 
We expect the slope for the none sentences to be less steep than the 
slope of the all sentences. The reason for this is the one-directionality of 
the Horn scales. The word some might entail the word all but this does 
not work in the direction of the word none. This makes the semantic 
distance between the words some and all smaller than the semantic 
distance between some and none. Therefore, we think that the incorrect 
use of the latter pair will be a graver violation than the incorrect use of 
the former pair. All the items in which we use the word all but not all 
the dots are black, are examples of reversed scalars. The large difference 
between our violation tolerance hypothesis and the pragmatic tolerance 
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hypothesis lies in these reversed scalars. The violation tolerance hypoth-
esis sees these reversed scalars as logical errors that might be acceptable 
to some people or in some situations. Therefore we expect the positive 
slope. Within the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis, these errors are never 
acceptable. If this were true, there will be no slope in the data of these 
items. This difference between these two theories is also why we includ-
ed the none items. The violation tolerance predicts a slope in the data 
for both these sentences, but the slope of the all items should be larger. 
The pragmatic tolerance hypothesis or semantic rules do not predict a 
slope for either of these sentences, so no significant difference between 
the two slopes should be found.    
For the some items, we expect that the mean ratings will not be 
pushing limits for all the ratios, instead we expect there to be a gradual 
increase and decrease over the ratios. We expect the peak of the rat-
ings to be at what each participant perceives at the ideal ratio for the 
word some. Based on typicality research of the word some (Begg, 1987), 
we know that ‘the preferred meaning for some is ‘less than half ’’(p.62). 
Several other authors have made similar conclusions (Borges & Sawyers, 
1974; Newstead, Pollard, & Riezebos, 1987). For the situation in which all 
the dots are black, we expect participants to use the middle of the scale, 
consistent with the previously discussed scalar implicature literature. 
Both the violation tolerance hypothesis and the pragmatic tolerance hy-
pothesis predict the same data pattern for the some items. 
In our experiment, we varied the total amount of dots used. New-
stead, Pollard, and Riezebos (1987) showed how varying the set size 
influences how people will interpret scalar term. It seemed that a larger 
set size leads to interpretations that signify a smaller proportion of that 
set size than when a smaller set size is used.
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4.2. Method
Fifty-six adults were recruited for the experiment, of which 22 received 
course credit in exchange for their participation, the others volunteered. 
Two participants were excluded because they did not finish the exper-
iment. The experiment was programmed in Qualtrics, an online survey 
platform.
For each item, the participant was presented with a picture and 
an accompanying sentence about the picture. An example of an item is 
presented in Figure 1.
In the picture there were always a number of dots that were either 
black or white. We had one between-subject variable: total number of 
dots, with two levels. Half of the participants got pictures with 7 dots, the 
other half got pictures with 35 dots. The participants were assigned to a 
condition randomly. The ratio between black and white dots was varied 
Figure 1. Example of an item with sentence and picture.
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and each participant received each possible ratio (within-subject variable 
ratio). For the second number of dots condition with the 35 dots, the 
number of black dots was always a plural of five (0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 
35), leading to the exact same ratios of black/white dots as the first con-
dition. The picture was also accompanied with one of three describing 
sentences (‘All the dots are black’, ‘Some the dots are black’, ‘None of 
the dots are black’). Each picture was presented to the participants three 
times, so every combination of ratio – scalar term was rated. The items 
were presented to the participants in a random order. Participants were 
asked how well the sentence described the picture. They had to give 
their answer on a 5-point scale, ranging from not good to very good.
Items in which all the dots were black and the sentence ‘Some dots 
are black’ was given, is considered a scalar implicature. The word some 
is underinformative in this example and the word all would have been 
more optimal.
4.3. Results
In the data analysis, we will compare the observed results to what we 
would expect them to be when participants follow semantic rules. We 
will call these data the estimated data. We expect that for the trials in 
which the all sentence is used, participants will pick the lowest option on 
the scale, except for the situations in which all the dots are black, in which 
case we expect them to pick the highest option on the scale. For the 
trials in which the pictures are combined with the sentence ‘No dots are 
black’, semantics predict the opposite pattern. For the some situations, 
we expect the lowest score for the picture with no black dots and a 
maximum score for the middle options. For the combination of the some 
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sentence and the picture in which all the dots are black, any score be-
tween 1 and 5 is valid. This particular item is the scalar implicature. A log-
ical response on this item would be a 5 and a pragmatic response would 
be 1. However, because the participants are given a scale to answer, we 
expect them to use the middle of the scale to express this conflict.
We ran a repeated measures design with scalar term and ratio 
of dots as within-subjects variables and total number of dots as a be-
tween-subjects variable. We corrected our p-values with the Green-
house-Geisser method (pGG) because the assumption of sphericity was 
violated. We found main effects for scalar term (F(2, 98) = 173.85, pGG 
< .001) and ratio of dots (F(7, 343) = 27.34, pGG < .001). There was no 
main effect for total number of dots. The scalar term interacted with ra-
tio of dots (F(14, 686) = 230.17, pGG < .001), but not with total number 
of dots. Ratio of dots interacted with total number of dots (F(7, 343) = 
5.01, pGG < .001), and there was also a three-way interaction with scalar 
term (F(14, 686) = 4.96, pGG = .001).
We ran paired samples t-tests between the observed data and 
the estimated data, for all three scalar term types. We found that for the 
all and the some items there was a significant difference between the 
observed data and the data we would expect based on semantics (all: 
t(431) = 5.58, p < .001; some: t(428) = 14.87, p < .001). For the none 
items there was no significant difference between the observed and the 
estimated data (t(431) = 1.62, p = .11). In Figure 2, 3 and 4, we clearly 
see how, especially for the all and the some items, there is a difference 
between the observed and the estimated data. The none data lies much 
closer to the estimated data.
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Figure 2. Average responses for ‘all’ items for the different dot ratios.
Figure 3. Average responses for ‘some’ items for the different dot ratios.
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Next, we want to check whether the answering patterns for the 
all and none items increase and decrease linearly, as we would expect 
according to the violation tolerance hypothesis. We find that the ratio of 
dots predicts the all items linearly (ß = .33, t(430) = 13.24, p < .001). We 
found the same results for the none items ((ß = -.30, t(430) = 13.46, p < 
.001). These significant results can probably be explained by the last and 
first ratio of the all and none items, respectively. Therefore, we will run 
these analyses again but without the 7/7 ratio of the all items and the 
0/7 ratio of the none items. Now, we do not find a significant linear trend 
for the all items (ß = .021, t(376) = 1.22, p = .22), nor did we find one 
for the none items (ß = -.009, t(376) = .84, p = .40). Lastly, we checked 
whether the slope of either of these variables was larger than the other, 
Figure 4. Average responses for ‘none’ items for the different dot ratios.
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but again we did not find an effect (ß = -.016, t(376) = .74, p = .46). 
These results indicate that the differences between the all and none sen-
tences we found with the t-tests are not explained by a linear trend or 
the lack thereof in either one of the variables. It seems that these results 
do not support the violation tolerance hypothesis.
For the some sentences we clearly see in Figure 3 that the ob-
served and the estimated data are different from each other, except for 
the 0/7 ratio. The results for this item type do point in the direction of 
the violation tolerance hypotheses. The average response for the 7/7 
ratio is, like we expected for a scalar implicature, somewhere in between 
the lowest and the highest score (M = 1,94; SD = 1,27). For the middle 
ratios, there seems to take on the shape of a right-skewed parabola. It 
seems that the optimal ratio for the world some, lies around 2/7. Howev-
er, when we separate these data for the two total number of dots condi-
tions (Figure 5); we see that for the high total number of dots, the graph 
is even more skewed. It seems that it is not so much the ratio of black 
and white dots that is important, but more the actual number of black 
dots. This is probably the explanation for the interaction effect between 
the ratio of dots and the total number of dots.
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4.4. Discussion
We explained that there are two possible patterns that our results could 
take on. The pattern that we would expect if participants rated the stim-
uli purely based on semantic rules, and the pattern we expect based on 
our violation tolerance hypothesis. Our results do not show a better fit 
for one pattern or the other. We found that the stimuli that contained 
the words all and none follow the pattern based on semantic rules. Par-
ticipants chose the highest rating for the optimal situations, which are 
when all the dots are black in the all sentences and when there are no 
black dots for the none sentences. For all the other situations, participants 
chose the lowest ratings. Although we found a difference between the 
Figure 5. Average responses for the ‘some’ items  
for the two total number of dots condition.
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predicted pattern and the actual data for the all sentences, this pattern 
could not be explained by any further analyses. We also did not find 
a significant difference between the all and the none sentences. This is 
consistent with the expected pattern based on semantic rules and the 
pragmatic tolerance hypothesis, but not with the violation tolerance hy-
pothesis. In the violation tolerance hypothesis we expected there to be 
a difference based on the semantic characteristics between some and all 
which are not there between some and none.
The some items did not follow the semantic pattern. Like we ex-
pected, the ratings for the different ratios varied gradually. As expected, 
the rating was the lowest when there were no black dots, it increased 
gradually over the items, with the highest rating for a ratio that was less 
than half, and then it decreased again. For the item in which all the dots 
were black, the scalar implicature, we found an average score in between 
the highest and the lowest. These results are in line with the violation tol-
erance hypothesis. There are however also congruent with the pragmatic 
tolerance hypothesis. The some items are not the items that would have 
enabled us to distinguish between the two theories, only the all items 
and a comparison between the all and none items could have made this 
distinction. Like we said in the previous paragraph, our data did not show 
a difference between the all and none items and we were not able to 
confirm the violation tolerance hypothesis.
We did not find a main effect of total number of dots, nor did 
we find an interaction with scalar term. We did however find an inter-
action with ratio of dots and a three-way interaction. The three-way 
interaction is explained by the fact that the total number of dots is only 
significant in the some condition. We saw in Figure 3 that the pattern was 
right-skewed, with a peak around 2/7. When we looked at the two total 
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number of dots conditions separately (Figure 5), we saw that there is in 
fact a difference between these two conditions. The pattern for the high 
number of total dots is even more skewed than the condition with seven 
dots. The peak here lies at about 1/7 (5/35). This number is much lower 
than what we would expect based on the literature, which states that it 
should be ‘less than half ’. This makes us wonder whether it is not as much 
the proportional number of black dots that matters but more the actual 
number of dots that is important. Also, it is possible that the language as-
pect is important factor in explaining our divergent results. Our previous 
studies with both adults and children (Pipijn & Schaeken, 2012; Pipijn & 
Schaeken, 2013), complemented with other studies that were conduct-
ed in Dutch (De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Geurts & Pouscoulous, 2009) 
show much higher rates of pragmatic reasoning than studies is other 
languages (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Noveck & Posada, 2003). The interpre-
tation of the word some might very well differ between languages. In that 
case, the optimal number or proportion for the word some could be 
lower in Dutch than it is in other languages. A study with either a much 
higher number of dots than 35 or with 35 dots in which each possible 
ratio of dots is presented, or a language comparison study, would bring 
more clarity on this issue.
Like we already mentioned, our results pointed in the direction of 
the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis and not to the violation tolerance 
hypothesis. In light of this, there are some general considerations we 
would like to point out. First of all, we are very surprised that we were 
not able to replicate Van Tiel (2014) with our experiment. We did not 
find the steep positive slope in the all data that was present in the Van 
Tiel study. Our paradigm was very similar to his so we expected the 
same patterns, but we did not find them. The pattern for the some sen-
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tences was fairly similar to ours with the only difference being that in the 
Van Tiel study the highest rating was found just below half of the dots, a 
much higher ratio than in our study and congruent with the literature. 
The all sentences pattern was different. The pattern found in Van Tiel 
was just about what we expected on the basis of the violation tolerance 
hypothesis. Van Tiel found a gradual increase in ratings. Van Tiel did not 
include the none condition in his study. It is unclear to us why we were 
not able to replicate these results. The adjustments we made to the par-
adigm were only minor. First of all, we changed the total number of dots. 
Van Tiel used ten dots is every condition. Secondly, he used a 7-point 
rating scale, as opposed to the 5-point scale we used. These adjustments 
seem only minor but perhaps they had a larger impact than we expected 
them to have.
There are two other factors that might explain these differences. 
First of all, Van Tiel did his study in English, while we did ours in Dutch. 
As previously mentioned, there are language differences in the interpre-
tation of scalar implicatures. Dutch participants have already proven to 
be more pragmatic than English or French participants. The direction of 
this language difference only makes the situation more confusing though. 
If Dutch participants are in fact less logical and thus less concerned with 
the literal meaning of words, then you would expect them to be more 
open to semantic errors like reversed scalars. On the other hand, if you 
look at it from Grice’s Maxims it is possible that Dutch participants give a 
higher priority to the Maxim of Quality which states that all given infor-
mation has to be true. This Maxim does not leave room for ambiguous 
interpretation of words and this would apply to both scalar implicatures, 
which would lead them to be pragmatic, as to reversed scalars (which 
would lead them to explicitly reject them. A second factor that was al-
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tered in our study and that could make a difference, is that Van Tiel used 
the word every. In our study, we used the Dutch word alle, which closest 
translation in English would be all. The closest Dutch translations of the 
word every however, would be iedere or elke. While all these words lie 
very close to each other, both in English as in Dutch, it is still possible 
that they do lead to small interpretational differences that influenced our 
results.
A second large discussion topic about our study is that this study 
was conducted with adults. Results would probably have been very dif-
ferent if we had tested children and we strongly believe that a study with 
children should be conducted in the future. Our previous studies have 
shown some clear differences between children and adults, especially for 
the reversed scalar items. The reversed scalar items in this study would 
have been all the items in which not all the dots were black, combined 
with an all sentence. In previous scalar implicature research on adults, the 
interesting reversed scalar phenomenon was not found. For example, 
in a study by Bott and Noveck (2004), the reversed scalar items were 
never found to be any different from other control items. Not even in 
the reaction time data was there any sign of participants treating these 
items differently. If adult participants did experience some sort of am-
biguity about these items, this could be manifest in the reaction time 
data, regardless of their final response. The data in the study by Noveck 
(2001) already showed a small indication in this direction. He found that 
children of 7 to 8 years old were less accurate on these items than they 
were on other control items, but children of the ages of 10 and 11 did 
not show this effect any more. We do not know whether this difference 
with the other control items was significant. Even if adults do have some 
ambiguous feelings about this type of item, they might be too small and 
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our experiment not sensitive enough to pick them up. In this light we 
want the recall the significant t-test between the estimated data and the 
observed data for the all sentences. Perhaps this result is a hint towards 
the effect we are speaking of. Yet it remains unclear why this experiment 
did not pick up on this effect while our previous experiments did ( Pipijn 
& Schaeken, 2012). Perhaps the nature of our stimuli is to blame. In our 
previous experiments we used mostly drawings as stimuli while we used 
the more monotonous dots in this experiment. Scalar implicature re-
search is known to be sensitive to changes in task features; perhaps this 
change was too big. 
A logical next step would be to test children, perhaps even pre-
schoolers, with the same paradigm used in this study. Our previous ex-
periments have showed that the reversed scalars effect is a lot more 
robust in children, especially in preschoolers (Pipijn & Schaeken, 2013). 
We expect that preschoolers and children are a lot less semantically 
correct than adults about all items. We expect them to confirm the vio-
lation tolerance hypothesis in a way adults clearly could not. We would 
expect a similar pattern for the some items as adults, but we also expect 
that for the all and the none items there is a small but significant slope in 
the response pattern. Even though our experiment was not able to con-
firm the violation tolerance hypothesis yet, the results from our previous 
studies clearly indicate that there is more to the processing of  the words 
some and all. These results would be able to unambiguously confirm or 
reject the violation tolerance hypothesis.
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Abstract
Many studies on scalar implicatures have focused on the flagship exam-
ple of <some, all>. This study joins a growing amount of research that 
addresses the issue that there is in fact large scalar diversity and not all 
the different scales can just be generalized. In this study, we conducted 
two experiments with several different scalar implicatures. In the first 
experiment we tested adults, in the second experiment we tested pre-
schoolers. Not only were participants asked to judge scalar implicatures 
in a binary fashion, they were also asked to rate them on a Likert-scale. 
In the experiment with the adults, we varied the amount of available 
cognitive resources by adding a secondary task. Our study shows that 
there clearly is scalar diversity between quantifiers and gradable adjec-
tives. This diversity is further enlarged by the different response methods. 
No effect of available cognitive resources was found. Our results show 
that the scope of scalar implicature research needs to be broadened to 
give a realistic representation of pragmatic communication. 
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5.1. Introduction
The complexity of human conversations provides endless inspiration 
for research and discussion. One of the discussion topics is the nature 
of scalar implicatures. In a normal conversation, people utter words for 
which the meaning extends far beyond the literal meaning and often, the 
listener comprehends that intended meaning. Take into consideration the 
following example:
(1) Some people find the Belgian governmental structure 
complicated.
(2) Not all people find the Belgian governmental struc-
ture complicated. 
(3) All people find the Belgian governmental structure 
complicated.
It seems obvious that sentence (1) will be interpreted as sentence 
(2) most of the time, instead of sentence (3). However, according to the 
logical semantic meaning of the word some, which is some and possibly all, 
sentence (3) is also an accurate interpretation of sentence (1). Then why 
do most people prefer the interpretation in sentence (2)? The reason 
for this lies in the pragmatic interpretation of some as some and not all. 
Horn (1984) sees this example as a variety of the conversational impli-
cature. When a person is confronted with a sentence like (1), his or her 
initial interpretation will be some and possibly all. Later on, the listener 
may change this interpretation to the pragmatic one and make the scalar 
implicature. If the speaker had the intent to refer to all the people, then 
surely he would have done so by saying all and not some. Therefore, the 
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all interpretation of some is not optimal and the not all interpretation is 
far more likely. This argumentation is based on what Grice (1989) calls 
the cooperative principle. People are to be as informative as possible in 
conversations. When they use a weaker term instead of a stronger one, 
it must be because the stronger one is not suitable. There are howev-
er different opinions on how this pragmatic meaning comes to be. As 
opposed to Horn (1972), Levinson (2000) believes that not the logical 
meaning, but the pragmatic meaning is default in human thinking. This 
pragmatic interpretation might then be cancelled when the situation calls 
for it. 
The words some and all can be put on a scale going from weak 
to strong. This is why we call this pragmatic phenomenon a scalar impli-
cature. Of course, <some, all> is not the only example of a scale that is 
used in scalar implicature research. Another frequently used scale is the 
<or, and> scale, where and is entailed by the weaker term or. Most stud-
ies in this research area have used these two scales, <some, all> and <or, 
and>, as the prototypical examples of scalar implicatures and the results 
of these studies have been generalized to all scalar implicatures. Other 
possible examples of scales are verbs (<might, must>, <like, love>), ad-
jectives (<good, excellent>, <warm, hot>), adverbs (<sometimes, always>) 
and nouns (<mammal, dog>). 
Until recently, this alleged uniformity of the processes underlying 
all scalar implicatures had not been questioned. In 2009, Doran, Baker, 
McNabb, Larson, and Ward started to explore this widely accepted as-
sumption. In their study they compared quantificational items like the 
classic <some, all> but also others like <possibly, definitely>, to other 
scales as for instance cardinal numbers (e.g., <2, 3, 4>), ranked orderings 
(e.g., <beginner, intermediate, advanced>) and gradable adjectives (e.g., 
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<warm, hot>). They found that there is significant variability between the 
rates of pragmatic answers these different scalar terms elicit: Some scalar 
inferences are consistently interpreted in a pragmatic way while others 
are mostly interpreted logical.
Other evidence against this uniformity principle between scalar 
implicatures can be found in a survey of ten experiments, which was 
carried out by Geurts (2010, 98-99). A clear conclusion of this survey 
was that for disjunction sentences (containing or), the mean rate of scalar 
implicatures was much lower than for the sentences containing some: 
35% against 56.5%. 
All the studies discussed above used a sentence verification task. 
A straightforward example of this paradigm can be found in the study 
by Bott and Noveck (2004, Experiment 3). They presented stimuli of the 
following example:
(4) Some dogs are mammals.
Participants were subsequently asked whether they believed this 
sentence was true or not. Typical about this type of experiment is that 
participants have to judge the items with their own intrinsic knowledge. 
When confronted with items of this type, participants derived scalar 
inferences for 59% of the items. 
Doran et al. (2009) used a different approach. Participants were 
instructed to judge scalar implicatures, but from the perspective of Literal 
Lucy, a literal-minded character. They were asked whether Literal Lucy 
would agree with a certain utterance. Therefore, participants were not 
actually giving their own opinion. By asking for the opinion of Literal Lucy, 
participants are already guided towards an opinion that might be more 
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logical than their own. It is clear how the difference in approach between 
Bott and Noveck (2004) and Doran et al. (2009) can lead to differences 
in pragmatic response patterns.
The work done by Van Tiel, Miltenburg, Zevakhina, and Geurts 
(submitted) builds further on the work by Doran et al. (2009). Taking into 
account some of the issues they had with the work done by Doran et al., 
they constructed experiments to further explore the non-uniformity be-
tween different scales. First of all, they changed the task paradigm to an 
inference paradigm. In Geurts and Pouscoulous (2009), it was shown that 
an inference paradigm is much more suited than a verification task to ex-
plore the rich variety of scalar inferences. Van Tiel et al. conducted several 
experiments, all with the purpose of finding parameters that can change 
the scalar inference ratings. They included several different types of scales 
or word classes: quantifiers, modal expressions, gradable adjectives and 
verbs and they played with various characteristics of the scales. They 
looked at open versus closed scales (for example, all is the end point of 
the <some, all> scale, which is thus a closed scale, while for example cold 
is not the end point in <cool, cold)>. They also gave adjectives a richer 
context, for example <she is attractive but not stunning>. Other param-
eters they looked at were focus (whether the scalar term was the focus 
of an utterance or not), the word frequency of the two scalar terms in 
our everyday language, the strength of association between a weaker 
and a stronger scalar term, and the semantic distance between a weaker 
and a stronger scalar term. In their first experiment, they found large dif-
ference in rates of scalar inferences, namely between 4% and 100%. They 
found very high scalar inference ratings for existential quantifiers, which 
are closed scales, of more than 90%. Results show a clear tendency to 
interpret these implicatures pragmatically. This is a clear difference with 
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the results found by Bott and Noveck (2004). They found a significant 
difference between closed and open scales, with closed scales leading to 
more scalar inferences. Similarly to Doran et al. (2009), they additionally 
found that giving the adjectives a richer context leads to more scalar 
inferences. Lastly, they found that word class and semantic distance have 
a significant effect on the rate of pragmatic responses. However, they did 
not find any effects of focus, word frequency, or strength of association 
between stronger and weaker terms. Their study clearly demonstrated 
that different types of scales are not all the same and we cannot use one 
type as the prototypical type. Especially the some, all scale cannot be 
used as the prototypical example, because it triggers unusually high levels 
of pragmatic answers.
5.2. Experiment 1
A first goal of the present study is to assess the effect of another param-
eter on the different scales, namely response measure. In 2010, Katsos 
and Smith did research on scalar inferences with children and adults, 
while changing the response method. They introduced Likert-scales in 
the scalar inferences debate. Instead of just saying whether they agreed 
with a certain utterance or not, participants now had to indicate to 
what extent they agreed with the utterance. Both adults and children 
accepted correct control statements and rejected the false ones by us-
ing the extremes of the scale. However, for the scalar inferences, both 
children and adults frequently picked the middle of the scale. There was 
no significant difference between children and adults when it came to 
these scalar inferences. This is in strong contrast with other studies on 
scalar inferences with children. For example, Noveck (2001) found large 
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significant differences between children and adults. Katsos and colleagues 
replicated the effect of response type in other studies, thus it seems to 
be a robust finding (Katsos & Bishop, 2011; Katsos, Roqueta, Estevan, & 
Cummins, 2011). In the present study, we are therefore in the first place 
interested how this Likert-scale would influence other types of scales. 
A second parameter that will be explored in the present study is 
the effect of load on different scales. In their 2007 study, De Neys and 
Schaeken investigated the effect of load on the production of scalar im-
plicatures. Their goal was to provide further evidence to the discussion 
whether scalar implicatures are generated automatically (neo-Gricean 
view, Levinson, 2000) or whether they are effortful (Relevance Theory, 
Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995). In their study, they used a dual-task para-
digm. Before completing a sentence verification task with scalar implica-
tures, participants, who were first year college students, had to memorize 
a complex dot-pattern. After every sentence verification, they had to 
recall the pattern and replicate it on an empty matrix. This secondary 
memorization task burdened the executive cognitive functions. If scalar 
inferences are indeed drawn automatically, then burdening the executive 
functions would not have an effect. Results of this study however, showed 
that participants did make less scalar inferences. This is direct evidence 
for Relevance theory.
In this experiment, we will look at both the effects of response 
measure and load on the production of scalar implicatures. We will use 
the same inference paradigm as used in Van Tiel et al. (submitted). Because 
of our secondary task and the presence of already two conditions in our 
experiment, we do not want to overcomplicate the design even further. 
Therefore, we use only a representative selection of the items used by 
Van Tiel et al. We will test some quantifiers and some gradable adjectives. 
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Our expectations with regard to different scales are, in accordance 
with Van Tiel et al. (submitted), that the quantifiers will lead to more 
pragmatic responses than the gradable adjectives. This partly because 
of the nature of the different scales, but also because the quantifiers we 
used are closed scales while the adjectives are all open scales; Van Tiel et 
al. already showed that closed scales lead to more pragmatic answers. 
We will create two groups of participants. One will have to judge scalar 
inferences in a classic binary fashion, the other group will have to judge 
them on a scale. We expect the scalar response type (i.e., the Likert-
scale) to increase the rate of scalar implicatures. More specifically, we 
hypothesize less extreme average response patterns and more respons-
es on the middle of the scale when participants use a scale to respond. 
Quantifiers elicited already up to 90% pragmatic answers in Van Tiel et 
al., which we assume is close to a ceiling effect. Therefore, we assume the 
effect of response measure will be greater for the gradable adjectives, 
which still have some space for improvement. Therefore, we expect an 
interaction between response measure and item type.
Additionally and congruent with De Neys and Schaeken (2007), 
we also manipulate cognitive load by using a complex dot pattern mem-
orization task. This has proven to be an adequate way to burden partici-
pants’ executive cognitive functions. We expect participants to give fewer 
pragmatic answers when they are highly burdened with a secondary task, 
and more when it is a light burdening. More concrete, this means that 
especially for the quantifiers, a decrease in pragmatic answers can be 
expected when a cognitive load is present. For the gradable adjectives, 
we already expect fairly logical answers. Therefore, we do not expect 
them to decrease as much as is the case for the quantifiers. We expect 
the participants without a secondary load task to have the highest rates 
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of scalar implicatures, for both the quantifiers and the gradable adjectives. 
Finally, we also expect there to be interactions between item and load, 
and item and response measure. We believe that these interactions will 
point to the possibility that not only do different scales elicit different lev-
els of pragmatic responses, but that there are also different mechanisms 
behind the production of the different scalar implicatures. The different 
load conditions and response measures might then interact with these 
different mechanisms.   
5.2.1. Method
The participants in this study were first year psychology students of the 
University of Leuven, who participated in return for course credit. Partic-
ipants were expected to have at least 75% of the control items correct 
(see below for an explanation of the control items). Therefore, out of 
371 participants, 79 were excluded due to bad performance on these 
control items. We had a 3 x 2 design with three between-subjects work-
ing memory load conditions and two between-subjects response type 
conditions. The three working memory load conditions were no load, 
low load and high load. For the low load and high load conditions, we 
used a classic spatial storage task, more specific the dot memory task, 
which has repeatedly been shown to be an adequate method to burden 
cognitive resources (e.g., Bethell-Fox & Shepard, 1988; Miyake, Friedman, 
Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001). In this dot memory task, the partici-
pants were shown a three by three matrix with several dots in it. The 
dots were either in a one-piece pattern of three dots (low load condi-
tion) or a two- or three-piece pattern of four dots (high load condition) 
(see Figure 1). 
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This matrix was shown before the actual tested item, with the 
instruction to remember it. After the test item, participants were shown 
an empty matrix in which they had to replicate the dot pattern the way 
they remembered it. Work by De Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle (2005) 
has shown that the easy one-piece patterns only burden executive re-
sources minimally. In the control no load condition, participants were 
not shown any dot matrix patterns. After the dot matrix was shown but 
before participants were asked to replicate the dot pattern in an empty 
matric, a critical item was presented. Below is an example of such a crit-
ical item.
Figure 1. Examples of dot pattern matrices  
(left: low load; right: high load).
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John says: The water in the bathtub is warm.
Would you infer from this that, according to John, 
the water in the bathtub is not hot?
In each item, a person named John gives a statement which con-
tains a scalar term. Afterwards, the participant is asked whether he or she 
can infer from the given statement that, according to John, a statement 
containing a stronger scalar term is not valid. In other words, the weaker 
term in the initial statement is replaced with the second stronger term 
and participants have to judge whether John would still agree with the 
altered statement. We used several different pairs of scalar terms: one 
pair of an existential quantifier (some/all), one pair of an epistemic mod-
al (maybe/be certain) and five pairs of gradable adjectives. These scalar 
terms are a subset of the ones used in the study by Van Tiel et al. (submit-
ted). We did not use all of their gradable adjective pairs, but only half and 
we attempted to take representative ones that would vary enough in 
the number of pragmatic responses they elicited. For each pair of scalar 
terms, we constructed five different experimental items. All together, this 
led to 35 experimental items in total. We also included 19 control items, 
of which 9 were clearly valid and 10 were clearly invalid. These control 
items were presented in a similar fashion as the test items. All the test 
items and filler items were randomized. Below are two examples of a 
clearly valid and a clearly invalid control item.
The movie was bad = The movie was not good.
The singer is tall ≠ The singer is not blond. 
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There were two different response measure conditions. Half of the 
participants were instructed to give a binary answer. They could either 
agree or disagree with the second statement. The other half of the par-
ticipants had to indicate their answer on a 5-point Likert-scale. The scale 
ranged from completely disagree to completely agree. 
5.2.2. Results
We converted all the binary responses 0 and 1 scores to 1 and 5 scores 
so that they would be comparable to the scalar responses. Therefore, for 
both the binary and the scalar responses, a response of 5 is a pragmatic 
interpretation of a scalar word and a response of 1 is a logical interpre-
tation of a scalar word. Subjects performed as expected on the control 
items with the binary responses as well as with the scalar responses. 
Subjects in the binary response group had an average of 4.83 (SD = .32) 
for the valid items and 1.16 (SD = .29) for the invalid items. The average 
responses in the scalar group were 4.63 (SD = .42) for the valid items 
and 1.33 (SD = .32) for the invalid items, which are both significantly dif-
ferent from the binary group (valid items: t(290) = 4.63, p < .001; invalid 
items: t(290) = 4.83, p < .001). This difference can be expected as scalar 
answers are naturally less extreme than binary answers.
We ran a repeated measures design with the within-subjects vari-
able item and two between-subjects variables, namely load (three levels: 
no load, low load and high load) and response meaure (two levels: bina-
ry and scalar). We found a significant main effect of item (F(7, 2002) = 
652.06, p < .001), a main effect of response measure (F(1, 286) =41.18, 
p < .001) and a significant interaction between these two (F(7, 2002) = 
53.47, p < .001). The main effect of load was only marginally significant 
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(F(2, 286) = 2.98, p = .05) and there was no interaction with item.
The main effect of item can be explained by the extreme answer 
patterns for the control items, the existential quantifier and the epis-
temic modal, and the less extreme patterns for the gradable adjectives 
(see Figure 2). The main effect of response measure is clearly visible in 
Figure 2. The average for the participants is the binary condition is more 
pragmatic than the average of the participants in the scalar group. This 
is, as already mentioned, due to the nature of the different response 
measures. To explore the interaction between item and response mea-
sure more closely, we calculated t-tests for each item between the two 
different response types. All pairs were significantly different from each 
other, with all t-values between 3.59 and 9.44 and p-values all below 
.001. However, Figure 2 demonstrates that these differences are a bit 
smaller for the control items and the quantifiers. The control items re-
ceive extreme answers for both the valid and the invalid items, with 
little difference between the two response measure conditions. For the 
critical items, it seems that the existential quantifier and the epistemic 
modal are answered in a pragmatic way, for both the binary and the 
scalar responses. The adjectives however, are answered more logical in 
the binary response condition but a little more pragmatic when a scalar 
response is possible.
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In Figure 3, we compare the frequencies of binary and scalar re-
sponses in the different item types. In this figure, we can see how the 
answers are divided over the different scale values. From our analysis 
we already know that participants choose fairly one-sided for all the 
different types with the binary option. When participants can answer on 
a scale, quantifiers are still answered very pragmatically. For the gradable 
adjectives however, the middle options of the scale become much more 
popular. 
 
Figure 2. Average pragmatic responses for the different items,  
separated by response measure.
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5.2.3. Discussion
In this study we examined three different hypotheses. First, we expected 
different types of scalar inferences to evoke different rates of scalar im-
plicatures. Therefore, we tested different types of scalar implicatures: two 
quantifiers and several gradable adjectives. We predicted that the quan-
tifiers would lead to more scalar inferences than the gradable adjectives. 
Secondly, we predicted that response measure would play a role. More 
specifically, we expected that more scalar inferences would be produced 
when participants have to respond on a scale instead of giving a binary 
response. Thirdly, we predicted that the level of scalar inferences could 
be diminished when the cognitive resources of the participants are bur-
dened with a secondary task. 
Figure 3. Proportions of scale values for the different item types.
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Our results showed a main effect of item type. As we expect-
ed, the quantifiers were interpreted pragmatically more often than the 
gradable adjectives. Both the existential quantifier (some/all) and the 
epistemic modal (maybe/be certain) were judged extremely pragmatic. 
The gradable adjectives, however, were all answered logically. Additionally, 
there was a significant difference between the two response measures 
and there was an interaction of response measure with item type. In Fig-
ure 2, we saw that all items were judged less extreme when a scale was 
offered instead of the binary response option. However, the difference 
appears larger for the gradable adjectives than for the quantifiers. We 
believe this is partly because of a ceiling effect for the quantifiers. As we 
expected, parallel to Van Tiel et al. (submitted), the average response for 
the quantifiers with the binary response option was close to the maxi-
mum score of five. In Figure 3, it is illustrated that the binary pragmatic 
responses for the quantifiers are mostly divided over four and five, which 
is an extreme pragmatic response pattern. For the gradable adjectives 
however, the binary logical responses are much more distributed over 
all the different scale options. The three middle options on the scale take 
up more than 80% of the responses. So an extremely pragmatic answer 
on the gradable adjective scalar inferences seems very undesirable and it 
will not be used when it is not absolutely necessary. 
The lack of a clear main effect of load was surprising. We will dis-
cuss several explanations for this in the general discussion.
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5.3. Experiment 2
One of our concerns with the results of the first experiment, were the 
high rates of pragmatic responses for the quantifiers. Especially com-
pared to other studies that investigate the use of scalar implicatures in 
adults, we see that the adults in our study score extremely pragmatic. 
For example in an experiment by Bott and Noveck (2004) adults were 
pragmatic in 61 percent of the time. The extreme answering patterns 
that we found make it very hard to interpret the results. We therefore 
believe it would be interesting to conduct a similar experiment in which 
the levels of pragmatic answers are lower. The way we will do this is by 
testing children. 
It seems to be the case that children have more difficulty in grasp-
ing scalar implicatures and that they interpret implicatures differently 
than adults. More specifically, they interpret implicatures in a logical rath-
er than a pragmatic way (Noveck, 2001). For this claim, we find evidence 
in different developmental studies. Smith (1980) shows that 4- to 7-year-
olds treat the term some as compatible with possible all. They seem to 
interpret some in the logical way. Braine and Rumain (1981) also show 
that 7- to 9-year-old children favor a more logical interpretation instead 
of a pragmatic interpretation. Noveck assumed that the explicit logical 
element of communication develops first in life and that the pragmatic 
element of communication develops later on. Following up on Smith 
(1980), Noveck compared 8–year–olds, 10–year–olds and adults on 
their capability of deriving the implicit meaning of some, by asking them 
to judge sentences on their truth–value. The Truth Value Judgment task 
(TVJT) they used, involved statements with the words some and all. In 
each condition, three kinds of statements were used: absurd ones, ap-
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propriate ones and underinformative ones. An example of the last-men-
tioned is ‘Some giraffes have long necks’. The participants were asked to 
say whether or not they agreed with these statements. Noveck’s main 
finding is that 8- and 10-year-old French children treated certains (some) 
as compatible with tous (all) much more than adults. Their answers were 
more logical. Furthermore, the 8-year-olds agreed more with the logical 
interpretations than the 10-year-olds. There seems to be a developmen-
tal trend going from 8– to 10–year–olds to adults in the derivation of 
scalar implicatures. This trend could be a consequence of the processing 
cost that is needed to make a pragmatic inference. Children have fewer 
cognitive resources available than adults, which makes them produce 
fewer pragmatic answers than adults (Noveck, 2001).
In the second experiment we will examine the processing of sca-
lar implicatures by 5-year-old pre-schoolers. We will compare their re-
sponses on four different scales of implicatures, i.e. <some, all>, <may-
be, certain>, <warm, hot>, and <good, excellent>. In line with previous 
research, we expect that quantifiers will elicit more pragmatic answers 
than other scales. We deliberately reduce the number of items. The rea-
son for this is that we are testing very young children and their concen-
tration spans are limited. The children will be divided into a binary and 
scalar response group. We expect that the Likert-scale will elicit more 
pragmatic answers. We will also have a look at the scores of the chil-
dren on their Toetertest and whether this has any correlation with their 
capacity to make pragmatic inferences. The Toetertest is a standardized 
test that is used in Belgian pre-schools to test whether a 5-year-old child 
had acquired a number of skills that he will need in first grade. The test 
determines the extent to which a child has acquired the preparatory 
skills that he will need to learn to read, write and calculate. It focuses on 
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several sub-categories. The test will check for example whether a child 
can count, whether it can see the differences between two images or 
whether it understands words like ‘highest’ of ‘less than’. Because it is very 
hard to implement a secondary task with children and children are al-
ready logical enough without implementing a load condition, we decided 
to replace the load condition with the results on the Toetertest. Because 
of the pragmatic-developmental trend, we expect lower scores on the 
Toetertest when there are more logic answers (and vice versa). We can 
assume that when there are more logic answers, the implicature de-
mands more cognitive processing to answer pragmatic. We also assume 
that children who score lower on the Toetertest have less developed 
cognitive capacities that they need to reason pragmatically and so they 
will answer more logical.
5.3.1. Method
The sample consisted of 37 preschoolers (20 boys and 17 girls). The chil-
dren were between the ages of 63 and 72 months (M=60.73, SD=3.29).
The stimuli were presented in short movie clips with puppets. We 
used this presentation method to make the stimuli more attractive for 
the preschoolers. In the clips one puppet uttered a sentence containing 
a scalar implicature, then a second puppet would rephrase the sentence 
with a denial of the stronger word on the scale. The children had to 
indicate whether the sentence said by the second puppet was correct. 
Below is an example of such an item.
Puppet 1: Some books in the school have an image.
Puppet 2: So not all books in the school have an image.
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We used four sets of scalar terms: some vs. all; maybe vs. certain; 
warm vs. hot; good vs. excellent. Each set was presented six times, each 
time with a different context. We also included 12 control items which 
were either valid or invalid and we included 12 filler items. We decided 
to use a high number of filler items because it has been shown that a 
higher number of filler items makes participants less pragmatic and we 
wanted to make sure that our participants were not too pragmatic. 
The children were divided into two groups. One group had to 
answer binary while the other had to answer on a 3-point Likert-scale, 
congruent to Katsos and Bishop (2011). The scale was made more at-
tractive for children and was implemented in the stories told in the mov-
ie clips 
5.3.2. Results
The binary responses 0 and 1 were converted into 1 and 3 so that we 
could compare them to the scalar responses. The critical items were 
converted so that a score of 1 would be a logical response and a score 
of 3 a pragmatic response. 
We ran a repeated measures analysis with the within-subjects vari-
able item and between-subjects variable response measure. There is a 
main effect of items (F(3, 87) = 13.44; p < .001), some items provoke 
more pragmatic responses than other items. There is no significant effect 
of response measure (F(1, 29) = 1.92; p = .18), so there is no difference 
between binary and scalar responses. Furthermore, there is no significant 
interaction effect between items and response measure (F(3, 87) = 1.53; p 
= .21). In Figure 4 we see a downward trend for the different items. Quan-
tifiers provoke more pragmatic responses than the gradable adjectives.
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Paired sample t-tests were conducted to compare the answers on 
the different scalar terms. We compared six pairs of items of which five 
were significantly different from each other (Table 1). This explains the 
main effect of item.
To be sure that the responses on the items of each scalar term 
are equally distributed over the three response possibilities of the Likert-
scale, we conducted a Chi-Square Test. The results show that the distri-
bution of the responses on the Likert-scale differs across the items (χ2 (6, 
N = 37) = 15.91, p = 0.01). When we take a closer look at the pairs of 
scalar terms, we see that only <some, all> versus <maybe, certain> (χ2 
(2, N = 37) = 1.06, p = .59) and <warm, hot> versus <good, excellent> 
(χ2 (2, N = 37) = 0.29, p = .87) show the same distribution. 
Figure 4. Average responses on the different items  
for the two separate tasks.
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Not only do some items elicit more or fewer pragmatic answers, 
but also the way of using the scale is different for most of the items. The 
distribution of the responses across the scale takes different shapes de-
pending on the item. 
When the children had to answer binary, their answers were fairly 
equally divided across the two answer possibilities (see Figure 5).
Table 2. Paired sample t-tests between all item types.
Pair of items t-test p-value 
Some-Maybe 2.23 .033
Some-Warm 3.15 .004
Some-Good 6.69 .000
Maybe-Warm 1.32 .20
Maybe-Good 4.11 .000
Warm-Good 3.02 .005
Figure 5. Comparison of the proportionate distribution  
of the responses on both tasks.
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When we look at the correlations between the critical items and 
the scores on the Toetertest, we see that there is only a significant cor-
relation for the critical item <warm, hot> (r = .44; p = .01). The children 
that scored higher on the Toetertest, tended to interpret this particular 
scalar implicature more logically. The scalar implicature <good, excellent> 
also provoked more logic answers. However, in this case we don’t see a 
significant correlation with the Toetertest. There is a significant correla-
tion between the responses of the scalar term <warm, hot> and the 
responses of the scalar term <good, excellent> (r = .48; p = .01). These 
implicatures seem to be ‘harder’ for the children, meaning that their an-
swers are more logic on these items. 
5.3.3. Discussion 
In Experiment 2 we wanted to examine whether 5-year-old children 
process all scalar implicatures the same way. Therefore, we compared 
their responses on four different scales of implicatures, i.e. <some, all>, 
<maybe, certain>, <warm, hot>, and <good, excellent>. We expected, 
in line with previous research and Experiment 1, that children would 
process certain scales in a more pragmatic way and other scales more 
logically. 
We were also interested in the effect of response measure. We 
used different response measures, a binary scale and a 3-point Likert-
scale, as answer possibilities. We expected that the different response 
measures had an effect on pragmatic reasoning, whereby the Likert-scale 
would elicit more pragmatic answers.
Lastly, we were interested in the scores of the children on the 
Toetertest. We expected that lower scores on the Toetertest would be 
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an indication of less developed cognitive capacities. Therefore, these chil-
dren would answer in a more logical fashion.
For our first hypothesis, the results were as we expected. Each 
type of scalar inference seems to be processed in a different way. We 
found that some scalar implicatures elicit more pragmatic interpretations 
than other scalar implicatures. It seemed that some scalar inferences re-
quire more cognitive effort to be decoded in a pragmatic way. The re-
sults contribute to the evidence against the uniformity assumption and 
are in line with Van Tiel et al. (submitted) and Experiment 1. 
For our second hypothesis about response measure, the results 
are in contrast with our expectations and Experiment 1. There was no 
main effect of response measure. When the children had to answer bi-
nary, their answers were equally divided across the two answer possi-
bilities. It is possible that one half of the participants reasoned logically 
and the other half reasoned pragmatically. Another possibility is that they 
randomly guessed. There is no way of knowing whether their respons-
es were deliberate. Some children were consistent in their guesses, but 
others switched between pragmatic and logical responses. When the 
children had the possibility to answer on a Likert-scale, their respons-
es were again equally divided across the three answer possibilities. This 
indicates that the children chose their answers by chance. The use of a 
Likert-scale should show a more nuanced response pattern and give 
more information than binary responses. It is remarkable that we did 
not find this result in this experiment. Our participants did not seem to 
produce more pragmatic answers when confronted with a Likert-scale, 
while other studies indicated that 5-year-olds were capable doing so. Our 
experimental design may be the cause of this phenomenon, which will 
be discussed later.
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We could not confirm our last hypothesis. We looked at the cor-
relations of the children’s responses and their scores on the Toetert-
est. We only found a correlation with the scale <warm, hot>. The first 
experiment did not show evidence for the role of cognitive burden-
ing either. Maybe the pragmatic-developmental trend is independent of 
other cognitive capacities. It is possible that the skills that are tested in 
the Toetertest are irrelevant for the pragmatic interpretation of scalar 
implicatures. The Toetertest exists of 11 different subtest and not all of 
these tests have any relevance to pragmatic reasoning. It is possible that 
the results of the Toetertest lie too far apart from the specific reason-
ing skills and vocabulary knowledge that is necessary to interpret scalar 
implicatures. Another factor that can play a role are the items that we 
used. Maybe our items were too easy for the children, even for the 
children who had low scores on their Toetertest. Or maybe it was the 
other way around, perhaps the items were too hard for the children. But 
we did find a correlation with the scalar term <warm, hot>. It is under-
standable that this item is the easiest critical item. We can assume that 
children are more familiar with concepts like ‘warm’ and ‘hot’. Children 
are taught these concepts very early in live, because they are essential 
for one’s own safety. A concept like ‘excellent’ may be not so well-known, 
making this items too difficult. Concepts like ‘maybe’ are more abstract 
which also makes them harder to learn or understand. However it seems 
unlikely that this is the case when we take into account the overall high 
scores on the control items. It might also be possible that the children did 
not understand properly what was expected of them and how they had 
to judge the statements. But again, the high performance on the control 
items indicates that they did understand the purpose of the experiment 
and the meaning of the scalar terms. 
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5.4. General discussion
These results clearly show that merely giving binary response options is 
inadequate for examining scalar inferences with adults. For children the 
results are more complicated. Using the scale provides a more nuanced 
image. Even though we could not replicate these findings for children, 
earlier research did find these effects and we believe it is due to the 
nature of our task that we could not replicate them. For future research 
it might be interesting to conduct these tests with a within-subjects de-
sign. This way we could see if the response pattern for each individual 
participant would change along with the type of answer possibility. We 
could investigate if there are clear response patterns or if the responses 
are still randomly chosen and children have no stable response strategy. 
Either way, some general shortcomings in testing children this 
young must be addressed. We cannot be certain that the children were 
attentive the whole time. The attention span of children at the age of five 
is relatively small. We did our best to keep the test as short as possible. 
But even then it is hard to know how concentrated each child was. A 
solution to this problem would be to include more children in our ex-
periment to give us more statistical power. In keeping the experiment as 
short as possible, we also included a relatively small number of items. A 
larger sample would be better, but we would again be confronted with 
the issue of concentration. Therefore, we stand by our original decision 
to use a short experimental design. The shortness of the experiment 
also induced a lot of variation, leading children having to change over dif-
ferent scalars all the time. Dieussaert, Verkerk, Gillard, & Schaeken (2011) 
found that a task was harder for adults when there was more variation 
between the different item types. This variation causes an extra load for 
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our working memory, having fewer cognitive resources left for pragmatic 
reasoning.
Our results show, even more than Van Tiel et al. (submitted), that 
there is a large difference between quantifiers and gradable adjectives. 
Not only is one group more pragmatic in their ratings and the other 
more logical, the variability between answers in each group shows that 
this difference is more complicated than originally expected. It is clear 
how the assumption of uniformity between scalar inferences is not cor-
rect.
While the lack of a clear correlation between the Toetertest and 
performance is easily explainable, the lack of an effect of load is more 
surprising. Several studies in the past have shown this effect yet we are 
not able to replicate it. We offer two possible explanations. One possible 
explanation could be found in Dieussaert et al. (2011). They conducted a 
study comparable to the one done by De Neys and Schaeken (2007). In 
their study, they tested a group of senior high school students. Similar to 
De Neys and Schaeken, the participants got a sentence verification task. 
While rating sentences like ‘Some eels are fish’ as correct or incorrect, 
they also had to memorize the complex dot patterns. Furthermore, the 
participants also completed a Dutch version of an Operation Span Task 
(OSPAN; La Pointe & Engle, 1990), which was adapted for group testing 
and computerized (GOSPAN; De Neys, d’ Ydewalle, Schaeken, & Vos, 
2002). This task served as a working memory capacity measure. Their 
conclusions complemented De Neys and Schaeken. First of all, they rep-
licated the finding that a cognitive burdening decreases the rate of scalar 
inferences. Secondly and more importantly, they also found that this de-
crease is dependent on working memory capacity. People with high and 
low working memory capacity were less influenced by the cognitive load 
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than people in the middle memory capacity group. Therefore, it might be 
interesting to see whether performance in our experiment interacts with 
some general cognitive capacity measure. From a different experiment 
that our adult participants contributed to, we also had access to the per-
formance scores of our participants on a Raven’s Progressive Matrices 
Task (Raven, 1936). However, additional analyses did not reveal a pattern 
similar to the one in Dieussaert et al. (2011). Also, our participant group 
consisted of all first year university students. We can roughly derive from 
this information that this particular sample of participants most probably 
had high cognitive capabilities. They would probably all belong to the high 
performing group. Consequently, it is not that much of a surprise that no 
effect of load was found. However, the participants from the De Neys 
and Schaeken (2007) study were also first year psychology students 
from the same university and they did find an effect of load. 
A different variable responsible for the lack of a load effect in this 
study may lay in the presentation of our stimuli. In light of our results, we 
wonder whether the classic verification paradigm might not have been 
better suited for our experiment than the inference paradigm that was 
suggested in Geurts and Pouscoulous (2009). As previously mentioned, 
performance seems to reach a ceiling effect for the quantifiers. Almost all 
the responses were extremely pragmatic, very close to a maximum score. 
We suspect that the difference between the binary responses and the 
scalar responses on quantifiers would be larger when the performance 
wasn’t embedded in the maximum score. In De Neys and Schaeken, the 
average binary responses on the existential quantifier were lower than 
in our experiment. The only real difference between their study and our 
study being that they used a classic verification paradigm. It must be the 
case that the different presentation of stimuli in our study (similar to the 
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one in Van Tiel et al., submitted) makes the task much more prone to 
elicit pragmatic answers. This does explain the lack of an effect of load. 
When the primary task is too easy to begin with, a secondary task will 
not matter and no effect of load will appear. Therefore, we think it would 
be interesting to do a similar experiment with a classic verification task to 
explore whether the more difficult task does elicit a load effect.
From this study, we can confirm the conclusions from Van Tiel et 
al. (submitted). Not only are the rates at which scalar inferences elicit 
pragmatic answers dependent on task features, there is also a wide vari-
ability between the different scales that are used. Especially the <some, 
all> scale, which has been the most frequently used scale, seems widely 
unrepresentative and more an extreme case. We recommend future re-
search to be careful when using a binary response method and recom-
mend using a scale instead. Our results clearly show how participants’ 
behavior changes drastically when they can answer on a scale. It is ob-
vious how using a scale influences the rating of scales and gives a much 
more nuanced and realistic representation of scalar implicatures.
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The focus of this dissertation was on scalar implicatures. We intended to 
explore scalar implicatures more in depth and also look at their develop-
ment in children. We had two separate lines of research. In the first line, 
we focused on three features. We looked how task difficulty influenced 
the production of scalar implicatures, how the levels of pragmatic rea-
soning were influenced by the response measure that was used, and we 
explored reversed scalars. In the final chapter, we had a second line of 
studies, which focused on scalar diversity. In this chapter, we also looked 
at the effects of load on implicatures usage and the effects of response 
measure.
For our first line of studies, results were in accordance with what 
we expected. First of all, the response measure variable pretty much 
behaved as we expected it to. Like we saw in the literature (Katsos 
& Bishop, 2011; Katsos, Roqueta, Estevan, & Cummins, 2011; Katsos & 
Smith, 2010), the Likert-scale measure is so much more fine-tuned to 
investigate scalar implicatures. With the scalar response measure even 
children as young as 5 years old show performance levels comparable 
to adults and older children. Especially how the difference between chil-
dren and adults on scalar implicatures can disappear completely like we 
showed in Chapter 2 is a convincing reason to start using these scalar 
response measures as the standard paradigm. Katsos and Smith (2010) 
describe the pragmatic skill behind implicatures as ‘The ability to assess 
how much information should be communicated in a situation’. This ex-
act ability might be the reason why children perform under the level of 
adults when responding binary. Perhaps children are fully aware of all the 
information that is available and that can be given, but they have difficulty 
with assessing which parts of this information is necessary and which is 
only optional. There are two different reasons why someone might reject 
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an underinformative utterance. First of all because it is underinformative 
and the person judges it could have been done better, secondly because 
the person makes the implicature in which case the utterance is incor-
rect. It is not easy to distinguish for which reason both adults and children 
reject an utterance. We need to know whether a participant notices 
that there is in fact a pragmatic violation in the first place. Subsequently, 
the participant needs to decide that this violation is grave enough to 
reject the utterance. Using a scale as a response measure in scalar im-
plicature testing enables us to differentiate between these two steps. 
Both adults and children in our study indicated that they are competent 
enough to execute the first step. By using the middle of the scale, they 
can indicate that they are in fact aware of the pragmatic violation and 
that they possess sufficient pragmatic competence. The binary responses 
however, show us that adults and children differ in how they deal with 
this pragmatic violation. When given a binary response option, adults will 
reject the underinformative sentences while children will accept them 
more often. The pragmatic tolerance hypothesis is the explanation for 
this second step. Children are more tolerant towards this pragmatic vio-
lation than adults are. Using a binary measure is therefore not necessarily 
wrong. We can use it, as long as we are aware of what it measures, prag-
matic tolerance and not pragmatic competence. Unfortunately, this dis-
tinction between tolerance and competence is not made in most studies. 
While most studies will intend to investigate competence, the results will 
unintentionally be influenced by the tolerance factor. This question of 
what exactly we claim to be testing is especially interesting for studies in 
which pragmatic reasoning is manipulated. For example, in the study by 
Papafragou & Musolino (2003) children were trained to detect underin-
formative utterances. More specifically, the experimenters enhanced the 
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children’s awareness of the goals of the study. They found that this type of 
training led children to give more pragmatic responses. It is important to 
be careful in interpreting these results. If we interpret the results in light 
of the previously mentioned two steps, we believe it is more likely that 
by giving children training it is not as much their pragmatic competence 
that is influenced by the training, but their tolerance that is being sharp-
ened. There are a few studies that influence the pragmatic tolerance in 
an even more direct fashion (Doran, Baker, McNabb, Larson, & Ward, 
2009; Doran, Ward, Larson, McNabb, & Baker, 2012; Larson et al., 2009). 
These studies used a paradigm in which participants were asked to think 
how a fictional character names ‘Literal Lucy’ would judge the utterances. 
By doing this, they force participants to replace their personal pragmatic 
tolerance to that of a fictional character with a lower tolerance.
Whether or not the previously mentioned experiments altered 
the pragmatic tolerance of the pragmatic competence, is not something 
we can deduce directly from the data. Using a scalar response measure in 
this case could have given more fine-grained results. It would be interest-
ing to see whether scalar responses are also influenced by the additional 
training. If the scalar responses are influenced by the training, it would 
indeed seem that training influences the pragmatic tolerance. If however 
the additional training influences the pragmatic competence and not the 
tolerance, we would not expect a difference in scalar responses between 
a trained and an untrained condition. A replication of the study con-
ducted by Papafragou and Musolino (2003) for example, with a scalar 
response measure can prove this point. Especially the comparison be-
tween a condition in which children receive the additional instructions to 
make them aware of the goals of the study and a condition in which the 
children to not receive this additional instruction would be interesting.
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An interesting study to look at within the framework of the two-
step pragmatic reasoning process is the mouse-tracking study conduct-
ed by Tomlinson Jr, Bailey, and Bott (2013). Tomlinson, Bailey and Bott 
explained their results also as a two-step process. Participants start by 
interpreting a scalar inference in a logical way that is later enriched to a 
pragmatic interpretation. This change of heart is illustrated by the chang-
ing direction of the mouse. We can see the pragmatic enrichment as part 
of the pragmatic competence. Whether or not a participant changes 
direction is an indication of whether or not he is competent to make 
scalar implicatures. As a replication of this study we believe it would also 
be interesting to conduct a mouse-tracking study with scalar response 
measures. Perhaps it is possible to demonstrate the pragmatic tolerance 
with mouse-tracking as well. For starters we expect that participants that 
are confronted with a scalar implicature will start moving the mouse in 
the direction of the logical response on the scale but will end up clicking 
on the middle of the scale. If there is a process of pragmatic tolerance 
however, we can expect the participants to change the direction of the 
mouse twice. At first they will move towards the logical end of the scale. 
After they enrich their interpretation, the mouse will shift towards the 
pragmatic end of the scale and the pragmatic competence process is 
completed. At this point however, the pragmatic tolerance process takes 
place. The participant will be aware of the two conflicting interpretations 
and needs to decide how to cope with them. As a final movement, the 
participants will change the direction of the mouse towards the middle 
of the scale. This mouse track would illustrate both pragmatic compe-
tence and pragmatic tolerance.
Task difficulty proved to be a significant factor for pragmatic rea-
soning as well. We found that children were highly influenced by the 
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difficulty of the task. More difficult tasks led to less pragmatic reasoning. 
This is in accordance with the Context-driven account. If the pragmatic 
interpretation of a scalar implicature requires cognitive effort, then we 
would expect children, who have fewer cognitive resources available, to 
be less pragmatic than adults. This hypothesis was confirmed by our data. 
Children were less pragmatic than adults, especially on the more difficult 
tasks, Euler Circles and Immediate Inferences. The preschoolers we tested 
were not influenced by task difficulty. However, this might be due to the 
tasks we used. The way in which the tasks were made more or less diffi-
cult in the experiments we used in Chapter 2, was by altering the level of 
abstract reasoning that was required. For example the Euler Circles task 
that we used in Experiment 1 and 2 of Chapter 2 is a very abstract task 
and therefore fairly difficult for children. The Drawings task that we also 
used in these experiments on the other hand is much more heuristic and 
thus easier for children. This difficulty variable led to a large difference 
between the average responses of children on the scalar implicatures for 
the Euler Circles task compared to the Drawings task. While the average 
responses on the Euler Circles task were on the lower end of the scale, 
the responses on the Drawings task were much more pragmatic on the 
middle of the scale. This difference was not present for adults. For the 
preschoolers in Chapter 3 however, we had to modify the abstract task 
because it would be too hard for children this young. At the same time, 
we wanted to keep the task as similar as possible to the one we used 
previously so we could compare the results. Instead of having an abstract 
representation of blocks in Euler Circles, we used actual circles and actual 
blocks. Because of the real blocks, the circles became redundant. Chil-
dren could answer the questions solely with the blocks and without the 
circles. We kept them anyway, to make the task even simpler and to keep 
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the similarity with the abstract task. It is possible however, that because 
of these alterations, the task became too easy and that there was no 
difference in difficulty with the drawings task left. As a result, we did not 
find an effect of task difficulty. Moreover, one can argue that the original 
Euler Circles task elicits logical thinking about scalar implicatures because 
the task in itself requires logical abstract thinking. By altering the task to a 
less abstract version, it is possible that these logical thinking skills are pro-
voked less too. The heuristic nature of the Drawings task does not elicit 
logical thinking as much as it elicits pragmatic thinking. Again, this would 
explain why we did not find a main effect of task difficulty.
We did not find an effect of task difficulty for adults either in Chap-
ter 2. We assume all the tasks were easy enough for adults. Even though 
the tasks varied in difficulty, if they are all still easy enough, adults will have 
enough spare cognitive resources available to think pragmatically. This 
pattern was shown in the performance on all the different tasks, it was 
very high for both the Euler Circles task, the Immediate Inferences as the 
Drawings task. In experiment 1 and 2 of Chapter 2, all the control items 
were near perfect, and all the scalar implicatures were answered prag-
matically. For both the Euler Circles task and the Drawings task, perfor-
mances on the scalar implicature were on the lower half of the scale. The 
scores between the different tasks were not significantly different from 
each other. If the adults are already pragmatic on the most difficult task 
then there was not much room to become even more pragmatic on the 
easier tasks. There are two options to look at the effects of task difficulty. 
Either we investigate subjects who are less pragmatic, for example chil-
dren, and make a comparison to adults; or we make adults less pragmatic 
by adding a load variable. We executed the first option in Chapters 2 and 
3, in which we tested both children and preschoolers. But the second 
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option would be interesting too, to test cognitively burdened adults with 
scalar response measures. Adults were already tested in several studies 
with a load factor and a binary response measure and in these stud-
ies effects of load were found (De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Dieussaert, 
Verkerk, Gillard, & Schaeken, 2011). It would be interesting to look at the 
interaction between load and response measure. This interaction would 
be interesting because it could reveal how load influences the two steps 
of pragmatic reasoning, pragmatic competence and pragmatic tolerance, 
separately. It seems more plausible to us that load only affects pragmatic 
competence and not tolerance. Making a comparison between scalar 
responses and binary responses could give us more insight in this matter. 
In the last study of this dissertation, we included both load and response 
measure but we did not find an interaction between these two. Howev-
er, these variables were not the primary focus of this study and we used 
a large set of different scalar terms. Our study showed that pragmatic 
reasoning differed greatly on these items and that the items interacted 
with the response. Therefore, we do not want to draw conclusions from 
this study about the effect of load on the two steps of pragmatic rea-
soning. It is very likely that the different items clouded our results too 
much. We believe a simpler study with only one Horn scale would be 
more appropriate. On top of that is would be interesting to see how 
these results interact with working memory capacity. Dieussaert et al. 
(2011) found in their study that load only affect participants with a small-
er working memory capacity. If we look at this from the two steps of 
pragmatic reasoning point of view we can assume that load only affects 
pragmatic competence and moreover that it only affects the pragmatic 
competence of participants with low working memory capacity. If this is 
true, we can expect that we will find an three-way interaction between 
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response measure, load and working memory capacity. We expect that 
for the binary response measure the effect of load will be larger for the 
group with the lower working memory capacity. For the scalar response 
measure however, we would expect this difference to be smaller. As the 
scalar response measure only influences pragmatic tolerance and not 
pragmatic competence, than both groups should be able to acknowl-
edge that there is a conflict between the two interpretations. This argu-
mentation only works of course if pragmatic tolerance is not influenced 
by our working memory capacity. If tolerance is in fact influenced by it, 
then we only expect to find the interaction between load and working 
memory capacity, congruent to Dieussaert et al. (2011), but no three-
way interaction with response measure.
It is not clear how the task of the violation tolerance experiment 
rates on task difficulty. If we follow the same argument we used earlier 
about easy versus difficult tasks for this experiment, it is possible that the 
task was too easy, not leaving any room for variability between items. 
We still see this variability for the some items, but not for the all items, 
like we expected. We found that for the all items, participants almost 
always used the top and the bottom of the scale and barely ever used 
the middle. It would be interesting to see what would happen if partic-
ipants carried out this task under the burden of a secondary task. This 
burden would probably lead to fewer pragmatic responses for the some 
items, as we have already seen in the literature. But perhaps it would also 
influence the all items and change the pattern in the direction that we 
predicted with the violation tolerance theory.
The most interesting finding of this dissertation was definitely the 
occurrence of reversed scalars. We found that reversed scalars are not 
treated as the control items they are by children. In Experiment 1 and 2 
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of Chapter 2 we showed that children use the middle of the scale to 
rate these items, indicating some form of uncertainty or ambiguity about 
these items. It remains unclear why this particular item type has not been 
studied in previous research, as it seems to be the perfect control item 
for the normal scalar implicature. Especially the claim that scalar impli-
catures are formed because of the one-directional entailment of words 
on a Horn scales is being compromised. Our reversed scalars findings 
do not agree with this claim. If scalar implicatures are possible because 
the weaker term entails the stronger term and that it can therefore be 
used instead of the stronger term, then reversed scalars would not be 
possible. The stronger term does not entail the weaker term and using 
the stronger when the weaker is appropriate, is incorrect. Nevertheless, 
children handle these reversed scalars like ambiguous items and not like 
the control items they actually are. When responding binary, both adults 
and children acknowledge that these items are false. When they respond 
on a scale though, children especially treat these items differently and 
rate them as equally correct as incorrect. Adults are not as obvious as 
children in this pattern, but still they do show some of that tendency like 
children. They definitely do not treat them like the other control items. 
When we look at the preschoolers in Chapter 3, the trend becomes 
even clearer. For the preschoolers the trend is even visible for the bi-
nary responses. Almost half of the children accept these statements to 
be correct. Especially the results we found with the adults suggest that 
there is more at play in the interpretation of these scalar terms. They 
suggest that some general assumptions about scalar implicatures do not 
hold and that more factors must be at work. The results we found for 
the preschoolers, combined with the results we found for the older chil-
dren and the adults, show a developmental trend. While it seems very 
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hard for preschoolers to distinguish these items from scalar implicatures, 
older children already feel they are incorrect at some level, which is ex-
pressed in the binary results. Adults lastly, are even better than children 
at classifying these items as incorrect. This developmental trend is a clear 
indication that the results from the violation tolerance experiment could 
have been completely different if it were tested with children. The fact 
that adults are capable of rejecting these items binary, while preschoolers 
are not, is a clear indication that there is some skill that adults have de-
veloped, or some knowledge that adults have acquired, that children do 
not have yet. We believe this might be the skill to differentiate between 
logical and pragmatic violations. This skill is probably a mix between prag-
matic competence and pragmatic tolerance in the two-step hypothesis. 
The fact that adults and older children are able to reject them binary 
and preschoolers are not, suggests that this is a subtle skill. Perhaps the 
task we used to verify our hypothesis was too obtuse to pick up on 
this subtle skill. We assume that preschoolers might still have some se-
rious issues with pragmatic competence, which leads them to not even 
reject the reversed scalars when responding binary. Older children will 
have mastered the necessary pragmatic competence, but still have some 
issues with the pragmatic tolerance, compared to adults. Adults finally, 
have mastered both skills, and while they do not reject scalar implicatures 
when responding on a scale, they do reject the reversed scalars.
We are fully aware of the gaping hole in our experiment. Our vio-
lation tolerance experiment should have been carried out with children. 
Unfortunately because of the time constraints in doctoral research, we 
did not have the time to carry out this study. We can therefore only 
speculate on what the results of that study would have revealed. We 
believe that our results from the first experiments clearly show a wide 
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discrepancy with the accepted theories and that it is a matter of explor-
ing what causes this discrepancy. Even though the results of our experi-
ment did not favor the violation tolerance hypothesis over the pragmatic 
tolerance hypothesis, we still stand behind it.
We want to reflect on how our experiments, especially the viola-
tion tolerance experiment, can be reconciled with the Context-driven 
account. The Context-driven account states that participants will pro-
duce a logical interpretation first, and later on, only when the context 
provokes it, the pragmatic interpretation will be produced and used. The 
high levels of pragmatic answers with the children and adults we tested 
show that our tasks do have enough context in them for the pragmatic 
interpretation to be triggered. We wonder though how much of that 
context information is available in the violation tolerance task. On the 
one hand, one could argue that there is enough because the participants 
give pragmatic responses on the scalar implicatures. On the other hand, 
our task with the black and white dots is extremely abstract. It is a very 
unnatural task and one can question its ecological validity. There is only 
one way to interpret the task, there is no additional context given and es-
pecially the all and none terms have only one very straightforward inter-
pretation possible. If there is no context given what so ever, how can we 
speak of a context-driven response? Even more so, with no context giv-
en and overall extremely pragmatic responses, we can question whether 
those pragmatic responses that were given were just default, instead of 
the result of a costly cognitive reasoning process. This brings us back to 
the matter of cancellability. An implicature can be cancelled when the 
context asks for it. In this experiment, there is however no context and 
cancelling the implicature is not very easy, with the task being reduced to 
a semantic matching of a sentence and a picture. Several authors have 
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argued though that cancellability is a necessary feature of conversational 
implicatures (Blome-Tillmann, 2008; Borge, 2009; Grice, 1978). For a task 
like this one, we wonder if we can even still talk about pragmatic versus 
logical reasoning. This distinction suggests that there are multiple ways 
to interpret the sentences, which there are not in this case. The only 
possible way to interpret the all and none sentences is the semantic way. 
There seems to be not much room for the reversed scalars to manifest 
like there was in the tasks of the previous experiments. Imagine that we 
tested children with the violation tolerance task and their performance 
was as we expected, with a slow inclination for the all sentences. How 
should we interpret this? Would this be pragmatic or logical reasoning? 
Again we can say this is semantic reasoning that has gone wrong. Perhaps 
children do not fully understand the meaning of the word all. This par-
ticular idea will be discussed below, but for now, let’s assume that they 
do understand it. Children have repeatedly shown that they understand 
these words correctly, which is shown in all the other control items we 
presented them with, and it has been shown in the literature as well. 
More likely would be our violation tolerance hypothesis. Children think 
in a more heuristic way. They know all the meanings of the words and all 
the rules they are supposed to be following. They are merely less scrupu-
lous about those rules, independent of whether those rules are pragmat-
ic or semantic. This would mean children are capable of a certain level of 
pragmatic thinking. They do not thoughtlessly follow the rules; they play 
with them and mold them in a way they see fit. This would mean that 
children play with these rules and think pragmatically more than adults 
do, while adults think more along the lines of some well-formed rules. 
The Context-driven account predicts logical reasoning to happen first, 
and therefore to develop first in children too. The idea that children play 
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with the rules does not support the idea of the Context-driven account 
that we start our development by reasoning logically.
As previously mentioned, we assume that children know the cor-
rect meaning of words like some and all. We assume that they know the 
meaning, but that they are not very strict about semantic rules. We can 
link this to the two-step pragmatic reasoning process that we mentioned 
earlier. First of all, participants need to have a sensitiveness of informa-
tiveness; they have to notice that an utterance is underinformative and 
that there are two ways to interpret it, which was called pragmatic com-
petence. Secondly, they have to decide that this violation is grave enough 
to punish it, pragmatic tolerance. We previously stated that we assume 
that the problem for children with scalar implicatures lies in the pragmat-
ic tolerance, which was shown by the scalar responses. Children know 
the semantic meaning of the words, they are pragmatically competent, 
but their pragmatic tolerance is different from the pragmatic tolerance 
of adults. But what if there is a problem with the pragmatic competence 
as well? It is possible that the words are not fully understood yet. Barner, 
Brooks, and Bale (2011) already showed that preschoolers have a hard 
time coming up with alternative meanings to words like some and that 
the meanings of words like these is clearly not as well defined as they 
are for adults. Perhaps children have a fuzzy concept of what these words 
mean exactly. Obviously they have some general idea of what they mean, 
which enables them to give correct responses in control items that do 
not hold any conflict to them. When it comes to scalar implicatures and 
reversed scalars however, the semantic distance between these words 
is so small that it becomes harder to differentiate between them. In this 
case, children’s responses on the middle of the scale might not mean 
that they are aware of the interpretational conflict like it does for adults 
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but instead mean that they are not really sure, it represents the fuzziness. 
The results of a carrying out the violation tolerance task with children 
would not only give us insights about the violation tolerance hypothesis, 
but also clarify this issue. If reversed scalars were the result of fuzziness, 
then we would not predict a linear trend for the some items like we do 
in the violation tolerance hypothesis. Instead, we would expect them to 
rate all the different ratios (except for 0/8 and 8/8) somewhere in the 
middle of the scale, because the term all would be fuzzy independently 
of the ratio of dots.
For our final study, results were only partially in line with our ex-
pectations. Like we expected, response measure showed, yet again, that 
the interpretation of scalar implicatures is not a black or white story. 
There is a clear middle ground and offering a scalar response option is 
a way to reveal this compromise. Secondly, people treat the different 
scales differently. Not all scalar implicatures are processed the same way. 
Especially for gradable adjectives is seems hard to come to a pragmatic 
interpretation, which is easier for the existential quantifier and epistem-
ic modal. Like expected, the some and all scale is not a representative 
example of scalar implicatures. Yet this exact scale seems to be used in 
research over and over again. Do people assume there is uniformity be-
tween all scales? We acknowledge that to do research, you need to pick 
out an example to use and certain easiness arises when everybody uses 
the same example. We used that very same example in all our studies 
too, and we made frequent comparisons to other studies on scalar im-
plicatures. We realize that these comparisons are only possible because 
everybody uses this same flagship example. But there are certain risks 
associated with using only one example. We all make claims about scalar 
implicatures as a whole, based on this one example. By doing this, we 
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unwittingly have promoted this example to the prototypical example of 
scalar implicatures. Our study however shows that there is in fact large 
variability in how the different examples are processed. It might be possi-
ble that the some example is in fact a prototypical example of how scalar 
implicatures work. It is however also possible that some is as prototypical 
to scalar implicatures as a whale is to mammals. We have to remember 
that we only tested a small sample of scales in our study. In the study by 
van Tiel, van Miltenburg, Zevakhina, & Geurts (2013) a more extended 
set of 43 scales was tested. Thirty-eight of these scales however were 
adjectives and verbs and only 2 were quantifiers. This is a fairly biased 
set and probably not a representative set of scales that are used in our 
everyday language. Either way, a certain caution is clearly advised when 
interpreting results. Although several studies have already been conduct-
ed on scalar diversity (Beltrama & Xiang, 2012; Doran et al., 2009; van 
Tiel, van Miltenburg, Zevakhina, & Geurts, 2013; Zevakhina, 2012), more 
research is the only way to bring more clarity. As far as we know, none 
of the studies on scalar diversity have looked at more than 50 scales at 
a time. With the wide extend of our vocabulary this number seems pit-
eous. Perhaps it is possible in the future to conduct a study similar to the 
one by van Tiel et al. (2013) with a much more extensive set of scales 
and find an actual prototypical example of a scalar implicature. 
In light of this typicality discussion, we want to point out that one 
can also question whether scalar implicatures are a good prototype of 
pragmatic reasoning. In our dissertation we have made several claims 
about pragmatic competence, all based on scalar implicature research, 
but it is possible that scalar implicature reasoning is not a representative 
example of pragmatic reasoning. We already mentioned in our introduc-
tion that research on Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) showed that 
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there are differences between different subtypes of ASD when it comes 
to pragmatic inferences, but that these differences do not exist for other 
types of pragmatic reasoning (Baltaxe, 1977; De Villiers, Stainton, & Szat-
mari, 2007; Pijnacker, Hagoort, Buitelaar, Teunisse, & Geurts, 2009; Surian, 
1996). This shows that there are in fact differences between different 
types of pragmatic reasoning. We do not know whether all the claims 
that we have made about scalar implicatures can be generalized to other 
types. It would be interesting to experimentally investigate the claims we 
have made about pragmatic competence on other types of pragmatic 
reasoning. 
Lastly, we did not find an effect of load. This is surprising as pre-
vious research does indicate that pragmatic reasoning is influenced by 
load (De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Dieussaert et al., 2011; Marty, Chem-
la, & Spector, 2013; Marty & Chemla, 2013). Why we were not able 
to replicate this finding remains unclear to us. Even in previous unpub-
lished work, we have not been able to replicate this effect of load. We 
found other studies that did not find an effect of working memory either 
(Banga, Heutinck, Berends, & Hendriks, 2009; Janssens, Fabry, & Schaeken, 
2014). It makes us wonder how robust the load effect actually is. We did 
however find an effect of task difficulty in the experiments in Chapter 
2. Even though we tested the effects of task difficulty in the those ex-
periments and load in Chapter 5, we do believe we can make a direct 
comparison between these two and some considerations on this subject 
might be in order. We used task difficulty in our first experiments, but we 
believe it shares the same background as load. We believe that pragmatic 
reasoning required effort and sufficient cognitive resources should be 
available to support it. Both a load variable and task difficulty influence 
pragmatic reasoning because of this. If we add a secondary task, or a load 
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variable, we insert a large part of our available resources in that task, 
and not sufficient resources are available to reason pragmatically. If we 
use a very difficult primary task however, we also burden our cognitive 
resources a lot. A lot of energy goes into the basic requirements of the 
task and not enough resources are left for the pragmatic reasoning part. 
Therefore, the end results of a secondary task and a difficult task are 
the same, our pragmatic reasoning is impaired, and a direct comparison 
between the two should be possible. If we compare with our first few 
experiments, for which we only found an effect of task difficulty for chil-
dren, but not for adults, this lack of a load effect is not surprising. But then 
why are children sensitive for this extra variable and why are adults not? 
According to the Context-driven account, making the implicature re-
quires effort. But perhaps our load manipulation was not strong enough 
for adults, leaving them with more than enough cognitive resources to 
make the implicature. Children however have fewer resources to be-
gin with, and perhaps the most difficult task was more demanding to 
them than the secondary task was to adults. The secondary task we used 
however has proven to be an adequate load factor for adults in studies 
before ours (De Neys & Schaeken, 2007; Dieussaert et al., 2011), even 
outside the research area of scalar implicatures (Bethell-Fox & Shepard, 
1988; De Neys, 2006; Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001; 
Verschueren, Schaeken, & d’ Ydewalle, 2004). Why did it not work this 
time? Perhaps it has something to do with the participants that we used 
in our experiment. Dieussaert et al. (2011) showed that the effect of 
load only has an influence on participants with a small working mem-
ory capacity. The participants in our study however were all first year 
university students. We can make some general assumptions about first 
year university students, that they are more intelligent than the average 
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population. Perhaps they also have, on average, larger working memory 
capacities than the average population, which leads them to not being 
susceptible to a secondary load factor. It is also possible that making the 
implicature is ‘demanding’ in another way than remembering our dot 
patterns was. Perhaps it is based on another skill set than the one that is 
burdened in the secondary task that we use. Marty et al. (2013) found 
that the effects of load are different for the stimuli with some than they 
are for stimuli with numerals. While a dual-task paradigm has a diminish-
ing effect on pragmatic reasoning about some, it has a stimulating effect 
on numerals. Of course one can question the place of numerals within 
the scalar implicature research all together (Geurts, 2006; Spector, 2013) 
but nevertheless it is clear that the ‘demanding effect’ of load on scalar 
implicatures is not a clear picture.
We also believe that the robustness of pragmatic reasoning of 
children plays a role in why we did not find a load effect. Multiple studies 
have shown how easy it is to influence pragmatic reasoning in children 
(Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Papafragou & Tantalou, 2004; Pouscoulous, 
Noveck, Politzer, & Bastide, 2007). When children are so easily affected by 
task features, it is only natural that they are susceptible to task difficulty or 
load. For adults however, pragmatic reasoning is much more established 
and it is much less susceptible to outside factors like load or task difficulty. 
We suggest a theory that could explain this difference between children 
and adults and that could explain the lack of a load effect in adults, which 
originates from the intuitive feeling that we think according to the De-
fault account. Is it possible that our brain, as it matures, evolves from a 
Context-driven account way of thinking towards a Default account way 
of thinking? Perhaps, when we are children, we start with learning the log-
ical semantic meaning of a word and only later on do we learn to reason 
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more pragmatically. As we become older however, this pragmatic way of 
reasoning becomes our default way of thinking. Before we have matured 
to this pragmatic default, we are still susceptible to load or task difficulty. 
As soon as the pragmatic process does become default, we are not 
susceptible to them anymore. When we look at the study by De Neys 
and Schaeken (2007) that did find a load effect on pragmatic reasoning, 
we see that they tested first-year college students. Although no specific 
demographics are given in the article, we can assume an average age of 
18-19 years old. Most studies consider this particular demographic to fall 
within the ‘adults’ group. But is it possible that when it comes to prag-
matic reasoning, 18 year-olds are still evolving? Studies have shown that 
adult-level mature performance of working memory only began at the 
age of 19 years old (Luna, Garver, Urban, Lazar, & Sweeney, 2004; Luna 
& Sweeney, 2001). It is not unlikely that a delicate skill like pragmatic rea-
soning also takes a long time to develop completely and perhaps by the 
age of 50, we have evolved towards a Default account way of thinking. 
Other studies on reasoning processes in elderly have been conducted, 
but to our knowledge, there have been no studies on the production 
of scalar implicatures in late adulthood. A comparative study between 
children, young adults and older adults might hold prove to our theory. If 
there is a significant difference in the interpretation of scalar implicatures 
between young and older adults, this might point into the direction that 
the development of pragmatic reasoning is not finished at the age of 20. If 
this difference exists, it would also be interesting to replicate some of the 
experiments that are able to differentiate between the Default Theory 
and the Context-driven Theory with elderly participants. For example it 
could be interesting to look at reaction times, similar to Bott and Noveck 
(2004). Perhaps older adults do not need more time to pragmatically 
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interpret a scalar implicature. If they are in fact faster with the pragmatic 
interpretation than they are with a logical one, this could point into the 
direction of an evolutionary theory of pragmatic reasoning. 
This dissertation has given us several interesting findings. First of 
all, we have showed that task difficulty and response measure can play 
a large role in the interpretation of scalar implicatures. We have showed 
that these task features can influence the levels of pragmatic reasoning 
immensely. Secondly, we have pointed out that, as a result of these task 
features, it is important to keep a close eye on what exactly is being 
tested or manipulated in a task. Pragmatic competence and pragmat-
ic tolerance are two separate steps and it is necessary to make clear 
predictions on which of these two steps one intends to influence or 
investigate. Thirdly, we have given some strong evidence, in the form of 
reversed scalars, that put pressure on frequently used theories of scalar 
implicatures. These particular items have not been studied enough in the 
past and they may possibly hold the key to unraveling the process be-
hind scalar implicatures. Finally, we have reconfirmed that there is in fact 
a large scalar diversity and that one must be careful in using the ‘some’ 
example as the prototypical example scalar implicatures.  
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